278 



themselves are the metaphysical and psychological problems, and these 

 seem imperatively to demand a solution and almost invariably to ab- 

 sorb the attention of the inquirer. The result is that some waste their 

 labors in the production of unsatisfactory theories, and others, dis- 

 couraged by failure and impatient to approach the practical questions 

 involved, cut the Gordian knot by denying the existence of any mate- 

 rial distinction between right and wrong. Of the latter, the most con- 

 spicuous instance is presented by the theory of Bentham and Austin 

 and of the modern English school of jurists, which is based wholly 

 upon the assumption that the distinction between the just and the un- 

 just is merely of human imposition. 



§42. Of the Moral Standard. 



Questions of right and wrong, in the concrete, present in general but 

 little difficulty, and consequently there is a' remarkable unanimity in 

 the moral judgments of men in the same state of civilization, and even 

 in ditferent ages and countries, with reference to what may be called 

 the fundamentals of morality. No one, for instance, can contemplate 

 the crime of murder or robbery without disapprobation ; or, to refer to 

 less extreme cases, there are none who will deny the obligation to re- 

 turn a deposit, or to compensate for an injury, or to repay a loan. 

 These and similar principles are universally admitted, and in fact fur- 

 nish the crucial test by which all theories of morality are to be judged, 

 and to which the advocates of all theories appeal. But the difficulty 

 consists in expressing satisfactorily the ultimate test or criterion by 

 which conduct is to be judged ; and on this point the widest diflFerence 

 of opinion exists. To me, however, it seems that the solution of the 

 problem is to be found in the consideration that there are, in fact, two 

 standards intimately related, but between which it is necessary to dis- 

 tinguish, namely, the theoretical and the practical, the former consisting 

 in rational principles by which our judgments should be formed and 

 our conduct governed so far as it may affect ourselves only ; the latter, 

 — as we have explained — in the common moral convictions, or general 

 conscience, or, in other words, the positive morality of the commu- 

 nity, by which, in matters affecting others, our conduct ought to be 

 determined. These standards are not antagonistic, or even entirely 

 independent of each other. For, on the one hand, it is a manifest 

 principle of theoretical morality that the established morality should 

 be observed ; and, on the other, such is the constitution of human 

 nature, that, just as the cannon ball nearly coincides with the trajec- 

 tory curve as scientifically determined, so positice tends to conform, 

 and in civilized countries substantially conforms to theoretical morality. 

 The former has already been considered,* and it only remains, there- 

 fore, to consider the latter. 



* Supra, p. 236. 



