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§ 43. Of the Theoretical or Rational Standard. 



With regard to the theoretical standard, it is obvious that reason is 

 the sovereign judge of conduct, and that all assumed principles of 

 morality must be submitted to the test of its judgment. Hence the 

 standard of right and wrong must consist of principles or propositions 

 derived either from intuitive reason or from the rational investigation 

 of the nature of man and of his environments and experience, (a) 



Of these principles — besides that of Liberty, which will be fully con- 

 sidered hereafter — there are two, more general in their character and 

 application than others, that may be conveniently considered here, 

 namely, the principle of Necessity and that of Utility. The former is 

 rudely expressed in the maxim, Salus pnpuli suprema lex, and may be 

 more accurately expressed in the proposition that whatever is essential 

 or necessary to the existence and well-being of man or society is at 

 once right and obligatory ; the latter, in the proposition that whatever 

 conduces to the welfare or happiness of mankind is, if not obligatory, 

 at least right. 



(1) Of the two principles, that of Necessity, though less extensive in 

 its scope, is of the greater practical utility, and from it, as we shall see, 

 nearly all the admitted principles of political science are derived. It 

 may, therefore, be said to constitute the foundation of the science. 



(2) The principle of Utility, in the form in which it has been generally 

 asserted — namely, that of Utilitarianism — is altogether without definite 

 signification, and cannot either be accepted as true or asserted to be 

 altogether false ; but it may be asserted of it, as of indefinite theories 

 generally, that its influence, both in theory and in practice, upon polit- 

 ical science and morality, has been greatly deleterious. It will, there- 

 fore, be necessary to determine accurately the signification of the prin- 

 ciple of Utility, and to inquire how far it may be accepted as a rule of 

 right. 



To say that anything is useful is, in itself, altogether unmeaning. To 

 give the expression definite signification it must be stated for what and 

 to whom it is useful. Leaving out of view the former problem — which, 

 it may be said in passing, involves the whole subject of the destiny of 

 man and the end of human conduct — it is obvious that the term usefvl, 

 or utility, is a relative term, implying some man or men whose utility is 

 considered, and that its meaning must difter essentially according to the 

 correlative to which it is applied. Thus, obviously, the mere private 

 utility of the individual cannot be adopted as the test ; and we must 

 also reject the principle that the happiness of the majority or the great- 

 est good of the greatest number is to determine ; for it cannot be 

 asserted that it is right that the happiness of any innocent man should 

 be sacrificed to that of any other man or men, except in cases where 

 there is an obligation on his part to submit to such sacrifice and a cor- 

 responding right of such others to exact it. We must also reject the 

 theory of utility as commonly received, which is that general utility is 



