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the test. For the term general utility is indefinite, and we cannot deter- 

 mine from it tlie number or class of individuals whose welfare is to be 

 considered. 



There remains, therefore, but one form of the principle to be consid- 

 ered, which is that the happiness or welfare of all — that is, of every 

 individual — must be accepted as the test of right, and which may, 

 therefore, be called the theory of universal utility ; and this, indeed, 

 is the only form in which the principle is not obviously false. For to 

 assert that anything is useful to the community, or to mankind, or to 

 any other class, is to assert that it is useful to every individual of the 

 class referred to. Otherwise, if we speak correctly, we must specify 

 the individuals or class of individuals to which the proposition is in- 

 tended to apply ; as, for instance, that it will be useful to a majority, 

 or to two-thirds, or three-fourths, or to some other proportion. Hence 

 the only form in which the principle can be received is that in which 

 it asserts that whatever tends to the welfare of every individual in the 

 community must be accepted as right. But even in this form the prop- 

 osition is still indefinite. For when we speak of any course of conduct 

 as right, we may mean either that it is imperatively right, or obliga- 

 tory, or that it is merely permissibly right, i. e., not wrong. In the 

 latter sense the proposition expresses, not the notion of duty, but 

 merely that of liberty. In the former it expresses the notion of obliga- 

 tion, and in this sense I can conceive of no principle on which the 

 pi'oposition can be asserted to be true. 



It is, however, assumed in all theories of morality that the observ- 

 ance of right must necessarily tend to the happiness and welfare of the 

 individual and of mankind generally. And from this it may be in- 

 ferred that the welfare of mankind is a necessary consequence of right 

 conduct, and, therefore, if not of the essence, at least a property of 

 right ; and hence, that whatever is pernicious to any one is wrong. The 

 principle of utility, therefore, in this its negative form — that is, as 

 asserting that whatever is pernicious or detrimental to mankind is to be 

 regarded as wrong — must be accepted ; and in this form its principal 

 use is in correcting mistakes of mankind made in pursuance of some 

 fancied utility. The principle, in this form, is embodied under the 

 name of the Argumentum ab inconvenienti, in one of the fundamental 

 maxims of the law, and there are few principles of more practical util- 

 ity to the jurists. As given by Coke, the maxim is: Argume/itum ab 

 inconvenienti plurimum valet in lege. And he adds : "The law tha^ is the 

 perfection of reason cannot sutler anything that is inconvenient ;" and 

 therefore he says, "NiJiil quod est inconveniens est licitum, and judges are 

 to judge of inconvenience as of things unlawful." 



It is, of course, to be observed that in considering the question of 

 utility regard must be had, not to particular, but to general conse- 

 quences ; or, in other words, not to the effect of the particular decision, 

 but to the efl'ect of the general rule. For what is right or wrong, just 



