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or unjust, in one case must be so in like cases ; and hence right, as well 

 as morality generally, must consist of general rules applying to all 

 cases of the same class. This is insisted upon by all moralists, and is 

 biH a statement of Kant's Categorical Imperative: "Act according to 

 a maxim which at the same time can be adopted as a universal law." 



§ 45. Of the Method and General Principles of Jurisprudence. 



It is in the highest degree important, before entering upon the sub- 

 ordinate subject of the rights of the State, that we should have some 

 notion of the method and general principles of general Jurisprudence, 

 of which the subject of Public Right constitutes only a subordinate de- 

 partment. It will be necessary, therefore, to give here a brief epitome 

 of the subject. As we proceed with the work, the application and 

 utility of the principles thus briefly stated, which at first may be ob- 

 scure, will become clearly manifest. 



Rights are of two kinds, namely, rights of ownership and rights of 

 ohlig ition. (b) To the former class belong the right of personal liberty 

 and security, or of self-ownership, the right of property and the right 

 of husband in wife and parent in child and vice versa ; in each of which 

 cases we may say of the subject of the right, whether one's person, 

 property, wife, husband, parent, or child, that, to the extent of the 

 right, it belongs to the one having the right, or that it is his, or his own. 

 To the other class belong all rights to the performance of obligations, 

 wliether rising from contract, or delict, or ex mero jure, without the 

 intervention of either — the term "obligation" being here used, in its 

 strict and proper sense, as denoting a duty from one person to another, 

 the performance of which may be rightfully exacted by the obligee or 

 person to whom it is owed. A mere duty, without such corresponding 

 right to exact its pei'formance, properly speaking, is not an obligation. 

 Thus, where one owes to another money, or has the property of an- 

 other in his possession, either unlawfully or as a mere bailee, or has 

 injuriously damaged another, there arises upon his part an obligation 

 to pay the debt, or to restore the property, or to compensate the party 

 injured, as the case may be ; and there is also a corresponding right in 

 such other party to exact the performance of the obligation. But the 

 duty upon the part of a man to assist a neighbor or friend, or to perform 

 a charitable act, is, in general, a mere duty, and not an obligation ; nor 

 is there any right upon the part of any one to exact its performance. 



If we analyze the notion of a right of the former class — as, for in- 

 stance, a right of property — it will be found to consist merely in the 

 liberty ov power of the owner to act freely, to the extent of the right, 

 witli regard to the thing owned, according to the dictates of his own 

 will, and free from interference by others ; and this we will find to be 

 also- true in the case of rights of obligation. For such a right, in its 

 ultimate analysis, consists also in the liberty or power to act freely, to 

 the extent of the right, with reference to its subject; which, in this 



