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case, is euphoniously said to be the obligation, but is in reality the 

 obligor himself, Avhose free action the obligee, by virtue of his right, 

 has the liberty or power to control if he shall choose to do so. Hence, 

 obviously a right consists in the liberty or power of acting {facultas 

 agendi), in a specitic case, or class of cases ; and the aggregate of a man's 

 rights is therefore but another expression for the general liberty to 

 which he is justly entitled. 



It is obvious, however, that the liberty or power to act, in which 

 consists the essence of the right, is not to be understood as actual 

 power or liberty. For it is clear, on the one hand, that a man may be 

 prevented from exercising a right, and the riglit nevertheless continue 

 to exist — as, for instance, where he is unjustly imprisoned or deprived 

 of his property — and on the other, that he may have the actual liberty 

 or power to interfere with the rights or liberty of another without hav- 

 ing the right to do so. The liberty or power in which a right consists 

 must, therefore, be understood as consisting in rightful or jural liberty 

 or power — that is, liberty or power which he rightfully has, or which it 

 is right that he should have. 



In this definition, it will be observed, the terms "liberty" and 

 "power" have been inditi'erently used. These, in a certain sense, are 

 apparently opposed in meaning ; but, in this connection, and in their 

 strict and proper sense, are substantially synonymous — the difference 

 between them corresponding merely to that between the terms "may " 

 and "can," in each of which two notions are signified, namely, the 

 absence of restraint and ability to act ; for, obviously, one cannot have 

 the liberty to act without the ability, or the ability without the liberty. 

 Hence, in logical phrase, the difference between the terms is, that the 

 term "liberty" denotes the absence of restraint and connotes ability 

 to act ; and conversely, the term "power" denotes the latter and con- 

 notes the former. In all cases of rights of obligation, however, tlie act 

 wliich the owner of the right has the liberty or power to do is to coerce 

 another, and hence there is implied in it a power or control over the 

 obligor, and in common language this is, perhaps, the idea most prom- 

 inently suggested by the term "power." But in this case, as in the 

 case of riglits in rem, where no control over others is necessarily im- 

 plied, the term "liberty to act" is equally applicable, and, on account 

 of the ambiguity of the term "power," is, in general, to be preferred 

 as the more appropriate term. Accordingly, we will define a right as 

 the jural, or rightful liberty to act (facuUas agendi), in a given case or 

 class of cases ; and riglits, in the aggregate, or right, as jural liberty, 

 or the general liberty to which one is justly entitled. 



It follows, therefore, that the ultimate problem presented h\ juris- 

 prudence is to determine the extent of the rightful or jural liberty of 

 the individual. 



But as, in general, this liberty exists in every case in which one may 

 not be rightfully restrained by other individuals or the State, and as 



