288 



" ' If, then, my action or my condition generally can co-exist with the freedom of every 

 other, according to a universal Law, any one does me a wrong who hinders me in the per- 

 formance of this action, or in the maintenance of this condition. For such a hindrance or 

 obstruction cannot co-exist with Freedom according to universal Laws.' 



" These passages make it clear that Kant had arrived at a conclusion which, if not the 

 same as my own, is closely allied to it. It is, however, worth remarking that Kant's con- 

 ception, similar though it is in nature, differs both in its origin and in its form." 



(e) As for instance, thecase of Thornborrow vs. Whittaker, 2 La Eayne, 1164, where one 

 agreed for valuable consideration, to pay two grains of rye corn on the following Monday, 

 four on the next Monday, and so on doubling for each Monday of the year, — and the case of 

 James vs. Morgan, 1 Lev., Ill, approved in Chesterfield vs. Jansen, 1 Wils., 286-295, where 

 one agreed to pay for a horse a barley corn for the first nail in the shoes of the horse, two 

 barley corns for the second, and so on doubling for the whole number of twenty-four ; in 

 each of which the contract was held void. 



(/) In accepting the theory of the historical school of jurists, however, it is not necessary 

 for us to give in our adhesion to what is called the historical method, as applied to other 

 subjects — as, for instance, to political economy, or other branches of political science, in- 

 cluding theoretical jurisprudence. Thus applied, the theory, as I understand it, in effect 

 denies the possibility of political or moral science, and, as commonly used — as, for instance, 

 by the historical school of political economists — seems to serve merely as a pretext for 

 repudiating the force and validity of logical reasoning. In the true method, a thorough 

 investigation of historical phenomena is, of course, essential, for the purpose, both of ascer- 

 taining our premises, and verifying our conclusions ; but its fundamental principle is that 

 the deductions of logic are absolutely certain, and that all true reasoning is apodictic or 

 demonstrative ; and that in this respect there is no distinction between mathematical rea- 

 soning, and reasoning of other kinds. At the same time, it is equally certain that conclu- 

 sions thus reached are purely hypothetical, and must, therefore, depend for their absolute 

 truth upon the truth of the premises, and the truth of these, of course, is always a matter of 

 historical research. The whole method of reasoning, therefore, is well expressed by Bacon 

 in the well-known aphorism: "The syllogism consists of propositions; propositions of 

 words ; words are the signs of notions. If, therefore, the notions which form the basis of the 

 whole be confused, and carelessly abstracted from things, there is no solidity in the super- 

 structure ; our only hope then is, in a genuine induction," (Nov. Org., Bk. i., Aph. 14). 



