303 



point : ''Aristotle," he says, "struck out a new and altogether different part. In the 

 first place he made the capital advance of separating ethics from politics. Not only is this not 

 done in the Platonic writings, but the very opposite course is taken in the Republic. 

 Man is represented as a micropoUs, and the city is the citizen writ large" (History of the 

 Science of Politics, p. 7). 



The views of Aristotle as expressed in the above quotations, are directly to the con- 

 trary ; and it may be added that the Platonic view of the subject objected to by him has 

 also been very generally received by modern European publicists {v. Ahrens, cited supra), 

 ^ (Id., Bk. i, Chap, xiii, Fol. 2j. 



(J) Justitia (i. e., the virtue) est eonstans et perpetua volimtas jus suuni cuique tribuendi. 



Hence, abstract, or, as it is called by Aristotle, political justice, consists in rendering 

 to every man his right (jiis suum cuique tribuendo). 



Jurisprudentia est . . . . justi atque injusti scientia. "Jus," says Celsus, "is the art of 

 the good and the equal — ars boni et xqui; of which some one deservedly calls us the 

 priests ; for we administer the cult of justice, and profess the knowledge of the good and 

 the equal, separating the equal from the unequal and distinguishing the right from the 

 wrong .... following, unless I am deceived, a true, and not a pretended philosophy. The 

 precepts of ./MS are to live decently, to hurt no one, and to give every mau his own" 

 (honeste vivere alterum nan Ixdere suum cuique tribuere). 



" Jus civile is that which neither recedes altogether from the Jus naturale, or Jus gen- 

 tium, nor altogether follows it. Therefore when we add anything to, or detract anything 

 from the common law (jus communis), we make a peculiar law, jus proprium, or jus 

 civile." And it is added : "Almost all contracts were introduced from the jus gentium ; 

 as for instance, buying, selling, letting, hiring, partnership, deposit, loan and other un- 

 numerable. 



" This law of ours is partly written, partly unwritten; as with the Greeks the laws 

 (nomoi) were written or unwritten. 



" The written law (jus scriptum) consists of the several kinds of statutes (leges, plebis- 

 cita, senatus consulta, principum placita), of the edicts of the magistrates or judges, and 

 the opinions of the learned in the law (responsa prudentum). 



"The unwritten law is that which custom has approved. 



" The principles of natural right (naturalia jura) which, are observed equally among 

 all peoples, being established by a certain divine providence, remain always firm and 

 immutable, but those which each State has established for itself are often changed, 

 either by the tacit consent of the people or by some later law." 



Compare Coke, Calvin's Case, Rep. 25. 



"Leges naturse perfectissimx sunt et inmictabiles ; humani vera juris conditio semper in iniin- 

 itam currit, et nihil est in eo quod perpetuo stare possit; leges huinanx nascuntur, vivunt, et 

 moriunt'ur." 



(k) " I have often said, that, after the writings of the geometricians, there exists noth- 

 ing which, in point of strength, subtilty and depth, can be compared to the works of 

 the Roman lawyers ; and, as it would be scarcely possible from intrinsic evidence to 

 distinguish a demonstration of Euclid's from one of Archimedes or Apollonius (tlie 

 style of each of them appearing no less uuiform than if reason herself were speaking 

 through her organs), so also the Roman lawyers all resemble each other, like twin 

 brothers ; insomuch, from the style alone of any particular opinion or argument, hardly 

 any conjecture could be formed about its autlior ; nor are the traces of a refined and 

 deeply meditated system of natural jurisprudence anywhere to be found more visible or 

 in greater abundance. And even in those cases where its principles are departed from, 

 incompliance with language consecrated by technical forms, or in consequence of new 

 statutes or of ancient traditions, the conclusions which the assumed hypothesis renders 

 it necessary to incorporate with the eternal dictates of right reason are deduced with a 

 soundness of logic and with an ingenuity that excites admiration. Nor are these devia- 

 tions from the law of nature so frequent as is commonly supposed." 



This passage is quoted by Dugald Stewart (Pldlosophy of the Human Mind, ii, iii, 3) ; 

 who, while admitting Leibnitz to be good authority, finds it difficult to accept his opinion. 



