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people, or, as it is in monarcliies, by one single person." In other words, 

 the most obvious dictates of reason demand that the powers of govern- 

 ment should, as far as practicable, be limited to such power as may be 

 necessary for the performance of its functions. 



This power must necessarily be very great ; and we may even say of it, 

 with Hobbes, "Non est super terram potC'itas quae comparetur ei ;" but still, 

 whether we consider the power of the ordinary government, or the 

 general power of the State, it, has its clearly defined limits. With regard 

 to the former, such limits may be imposed by the Stale, in the exercise of 

 iis function c>f political organization, by constitutional limitations ; with 

 reference to the latter, this cannot be effected ; but the obvious limit is in 

 the common sentiment of rights which measures at once its rightful and 

 its actual power ; or, in other words, botli its right and its might. 



With regard to the right of government, as we have explained, the 

 limit thus imposed is the rightful one, or, in other words, the State has no 

 right to violate it. With regard to its actual power, or might, this limit 

 is equally effective ; for it is itself backed by the superior force, and it 

 takes from the government, when this limit is exceeded, the only force 

 upon which it rests, viz., that of popular opinion. Nor is it necessary, 

 except in extreme cases, that this limit should be enforced by actual re- 

 sistance or revolution. The fear of such resistance is in general suffi- 

 cient, and this constitutes a sanction essentially identical in its nature 

 with that which restrains the would-be robber or murderer. 



This force operates also by simply producing the non-observance of the 

 commands of the government. Without this, as we have explained, laws 

 fail to become operative, and even laws originally operative cease to be 

 so. The power of government is also often successfully resisted, and 

 still more frequently evaded by individuals. In this respect despotic have 

 no advantage over constitutional governments ; in the latter of which the 

 safety of the rulers and the observance of the laws are enforced not only 

 by fear, but by the intelligent sentiment of the community ; while in the 

 former, not only are the laws in general less observed, in matters where 

 the power of the sovereign does not reach, but the sovereign himself is 

 frequently assassinated. Through these instrumentalities, viz , by fear, 

 by force, and by evasion, a real and powerful restraint is imposed upon 

 the power of the State by the manners and customs, or, in other words, 

 the morality of the people, and especially by the sentiment of rights and 

 by the force of popular opinion. For — as we have observed — no fact in 

 the history of mankind is more obvious than that beyond a certain point 

 the power of government is unavailing against the quiet but resistless 

 operation of this force ; and that, when opposed by it, laws in general are 

 dead letters — either failing to take effect, or becoming obsolete as manners 

 and customs change. This resietance indeed varies in different political 

 societies ; but its real and powerful efficiency — which, it may be safely 

 affirmed, increases with the growth of civilization — is strikingly con- 

 spicuous in modern civilized nations of the world ; in none of which can 



