312 



iiig the words or actions of another man, or of any other thing, to whom they are attribu- 

 ted, whether truly or by fiction. When they are considered as liis own then is he called a 

 natural person ; and whea they are considered as representing words and actions of another, 



then is he a/e/ginefZ or ar<//icto/ person There are few things that are incapable of being 



represented by fiction. Inanimate things, as a church, and hospital, and bridge may be 



personated by a rector, master, or overseer An ideal, or mere figment of the brain 



may be personated, as where the gods of the heathen, which by such officers as the State 

 appoint, were personated, and held possessions, and other goods and rights, which men 



from time to time dedicated and concentrated unto them 



" A multitude of men are made one person when they are by one man or person repre- 

 sented, so that it be done with the consent of every one of that multitude in particular. 

 .... And unity cannot otherwise be understood in multitude." 



(b) The nature of International Right or law is admirably explained by Vattel, in the Pre- 

 face to his well-known work on the Law of Nalions, from which we extract the following : 



" Hobbes, in a work wherein he discovers great abilities, notwithstanding his paradoxes 

 and detestable maxims : Hobbes, I say, was, I believe, the first who gave a distinct, though 



imperfect idea of the Law of Nations This author has well observed, that the Law 



of Nations is the Law of Nature applied to States or nations 



" Piiffeiidorf declares, that he subscribes absolutely to this opinion espoused by Hobbes. He has 

 not therefore treated separately of the Law of Nations ; but has everywhere united it with 

 the Law of Nature projierly so called. 



" Barbeyrac, the translator and commentator on Grotius and Pufifendorf, has approached 



much nearer to a just idea of the Law of Nations ' I confess,' says he, ' that there are 



laws common to all nations or affairs, which ought to be observed by every nation with 

 respect to each other ; and if people call this the Law of Nations, they may do so with great 

 propriety. But the consent of different people is not the foundation of those obligations by 

 which they are bound to observe those laws, and therefore cannot take place here in any 

 manner. The principles and obligations of such a law are in fact the same as those of the 

 Law of Nature, properly so called. All the difference consists in the application made of it, 

 varied a little on account of the difference that sometimes subsists in the manner in which 

 societies discharge their affairs with respect to each other.' 



" The author we have just quoted has well observed, that the rules and decisions of the 

 law of nature cannot be applied merely and simply to sovereign States, and that they must 

 necessarily suffer some changes according to the nature of the new subjects to which they 

 are applied. But it does not appear that he has seen the full extent of this idea, since he 

 seems not to approve of treating the Law of Nations separately from the Law of Nature, as 

 it relates to individuals 



" This glory was reserved for the Baron de Wolfius 



" ' Nations,' says he, ' among themselves acknowledge no other law, than that which na- 

 true herself has established, it will therefore perhaps appear superfluous to give a treatise on 

 the Law of Nations distinct from the Law of Nature. But those who think thus, have 

 not sufficiently studied the subject 



" ' When we would apply to nations, the duties which the Law of Nature prescribes to 

 each man in particular, and the right it attributes to him in order that he may fulfill his 

 duties ; these rights and these duties being no other than what are agreeable to the nature 

 of the subjects, they must necessarily suffer in the application, a change suitable to the new 

 subjects to which they are applied. We thus see, that the Law of Nations does not in every- 

 thing remain the same, as the Law of Nature, regulating the actions of individuals. Why 

 then may it not be treated of separatelj', as a law proper to nations?' " 



(c) " Though much has been said about eomitas, it is an improper term ; there is no such 

 thing as a decision from complaisance ; when jurists determine by the law of another coun- 

 try, they do it ex justitia; they are bound to do it. In questions of succession, for instance, 

 England and Scotland have different laws ; but if a man dies intestate in Scotland the Eng- 

 lish courts will not regard their own law in deciding on his suceesion. They commit injus- 

 tice if they determine by the English law. ' What is the Scottish law?' ought to l>e the very 

 first question that they ask. If they do otherwise, they do wrong. The judgment of Eug- 



