315 



government of one ; (2) Aristocracy, the government of the best, i e., of 

 a class so regarded, and (S), Polity, so called in the Politics, for lack of a 

 distinctive name ; but, in the Rhetoric, called Timocracy, the government 

 cf the worthy. 



The three perverted forms are, (1) Tyranny; (2) Oligarchy, which, 

 on historical grounds, he defines as a governmentof the rich {Plutocracy), 

 and (3) Democracy, which, on like grounds, he defines as the government 

 of the poor. 



It needs but little reflection to perceive that what Aristotle calls "the 

 perverted forms" of government are in fact the historical forms invaria- 

 bly presented. And, as all constantly recurring historical phenomena 

 must be regarded as resulting from some law or principle of human 

 nature, they must be regarded as the actual or real forms of government ; 

 and the normal forms as merely ideal. We may, therefore, regard the 

 former as Aristotle's actual or historical classification, disregarding the 

 latter ; and accordingly lliis is the form in which it has been generally 

 received in modern limes — the received division of governments being 

 into (1) Monarch}', (2) Oligarch}'-, improperly called Aristocracy, and 

 (3) Democracy, or Ochlocracy ; and this division, rejecting the inappro- 

 priate term, "aristocracy," we will adopt as our classification of actual 

 governments. 



It is, however, obvious that the utility of a historical classification of 

 governments consists merely in presenting them in a form convenient for 

 investigation, and that the object of such investigation is to discover the 

 true, or ideal forms, which, perhaps, we may never fully realize, but to 

 which it is the object of political science to enable us to approximate. 

 We must examine, therefore, more particularly Aristotle's views as to 

 the latter, as contained in his division of governments, into those which 

 do, and those which do not, regard the common good as the end of the 

 State. 



\ 58. Of Constitutional and Absolute Governments. 



On this point it is first necessary to observe that the term, " the common 

 good," here used — like the principle of Utility, of which it seems to be an 

 expression — is a very indefinite term, and, with politicians, as a practical 

 rule, extremely dangerous ; for, as we have observed, though the prin- 

 ciple of Utility — rightly stated— is a sound one, that of General Utility, or 

 Utilitarianism, which is the form of the principle most commonly used, is 

 a dangerous and even pernicious principle of polity ; being, of all the 

 weapons of political knavery, and political stupidity, the most effective ; 

 and we may, therefore, say of it, as Austin untruly says of conscience, 

 that it is merely "a convenient cloak for ignorance, or sinister interest." 

 But these observations are not to be regarded as strictures upon Aristo- 

 tle's views, but rather as intended to prevent his being misunderstood. 

 For, though he here uses what, on account of its indefiniteness, and also 

 on account of the prevalence of the Utilitarian philosophy, is, at this 



