318 



In every constitutional government the sovereign powers are, in fact, 

 divided. Hence, to avoid this ditHculty he is, as it were, compelled to 

 misconceive and misconstrue the principle of Aristotle's classification ; 

 which is that " the supreme power over the whole State," language that can 

 mean nothing else than sovereignty, i e., the aggregate of all sovereign 

 powers — " must necessarily be in the hands of one person, or of a few, or 

 of the many."* But Bluntschli asserts that, according to Aristotle, it is 

 the vesting, not of the whole sovereignty, but of "the governmental 

 authority " only, which determines the form of the State ; and from this 

 "governmental" (or regal) "authority" "the legislative power" is ex- 

 pressly excluded." "But this" (the goveinmental or r^^aZ authority), 

 he says, "is unsusceptible of division, and, therefore, as it forms the 

 principle of Aristotle's classification, there cannot be a fourth form of gov- 

 ernment. But on the same principle he might deny also, that either 

 aristocracy or democracy is possible ; for ia both these forms the govern- 

 mental power is — as we have seen — divided. (^) 



Accordingly he asserts — as, on the principle of the indivisibility of the 

 sovereign powers, he necessarily must — that in every so-called mixed 

 State, "the supreme governing power" — which can mean only the 

 sovereignty — is in reality either " in the hands of the monarch, or, of the 

 aristocracy, or, of the people."! {j) And this is true provided we accept 

 his new definition of sovereignty, as including only the governmental or 

 regal, or, as it is usually called, the executive power, but according to the 

 commonly received sense of sovereignty, and according to Aristotle's 

 definitions, altogether false. 



This peculiar notion of sovereignty is strikingly illustrated by Mr. 

 Bluntschli's views of the English Constitution ; which are, in effect, that 

 the English government is still a monarchy in Aristotle's sense of the 

 term. (Jc) And, on the other hand, there are those who hold the opposite 

 notion, equally unfounded, that the House of Commons is the sovereign ; 

 as was, in effect, asserted by Mr. Gladstone, in a late speech denouncing 

 the rejection of the Home Rule Bill by the Lords as unconstitutional, and 

 as is asserted in terms by Sir Frederick Pollock. (0 And also by Mr. 

 Ikirgess ; who says {Pol. Science and Const. Law, p. 96), that the House of 

 Commons "is now the perpetual constitutional convention for the amend- 

 ing of the Constitution." But this view is obviously erroneous — as was 

 practically manifested by its inability to enact the Home Rule Bill, and 

 many other similar cases. Mr. Gladstone's denunciation of the House of 

 Lords, on the occasion referred to, and his threat to abolish it, was, there- 

 fore, in effect, a threat of revolution ; for the powers of the lords, as well 

 as those of the king, are, like those of the Commons, vested in them by 

 the fundamental law, and they cannot be involuntarily deprived of tliem 

 unless by revolution. The extent of the power of the Hou&e of Commons 

 is merely to force the government to dissolve it, and thus to appeal to the 

 country. Hence, the view of Mr. Austin is more logical, lluit the 



*Bk. iii, Chap. vii. t M., p. 332. 



