320 



maintaining, as our forefathers did, the principles of right, public and 

 private, not only by argument, but when necessary, by force, and, in last 

 resort, by arms. 



Nor, indeed, as one might think is the case, from the difBculty en- 

 countered by modern publicists in conceiving the possibility of a gov- 

 ernment of mutual checks and balances between the powers of several 

 departments of government, is the world without abundant experience 

 on this point. The English people, throughout a history of over eight 

 hundred years, has presented a most conspicuous, and, it may be added, 

 valuable example of such a government. The distribution of the sovereign 

 powers first between the king and the lords, and afterwards among the 

 king, lords and Commons, did, indeed, provoke conflict, and numerous 

 civil wars. But to this principle of the division of sovereignty, and the 

 wars resulting from it, the modern world owes the idea and the possi- 

 bilitj'^ of constitutional liberty. And now that the conflict has for a while 

 ceased, the only fear is that the results of such painful labor and struggle 

 may be ignorantly lost, and government become a mere representative 

 democracy without constitutional checks. If this should prove to be 

 the case, the result will be attributable mainly to the supremacy of the 

 Austinian philosophy, and especially to the doctrine of the indivisibility of 

 sovereign power. 



Another illustration of the principle is presented by the Roman 

 republic; where, as we have seen, there existed, side by side, without 

 affecting the permanency or efficiency of the government, two sover- 

 eign and coordinate legislatures, and two sovereign consuls, each 

 vested with full regal powers, and also, alongside of the regular govern- 

 ment, the political organization of the whole people, an independent 

 sovereign organization of a class, namely, the Fkbs, represented by the 

 tribunes of the people, in each of whom was vested the power to veto, or 

 nullity all the acts of the other departments and officers of the govern- 

 ment, including even those of his own colleagues. («) Tlie English and 

 the Roman constitutions are admittedly the most successful that history 

 presents. Other instances might be cited, but these will be sufficient. 



Recapitulating what has been said, it will be observed, and cannot be too 

 often relocated, that the divisibility of the sovereign powers of the gov- 

 ernment constitutes the essential characteristic, or specific dift'erence of 

 constitutional government ; and consequently governments may be 

 divided on this principle into two classes, namely, the Constitutional, and 

 the Absolute or Despotic ; the former of which consists of those in whicli 

 the sovereign powers are distributed among several classes of officers or 

 departments, the latter of those in which the whole sovereign power is 

 centred in a single officer or assembly. 



