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efficient political order. That parties should exist, is not only desirable, 

 but inevitable ; but that they should be organized in permanent corpora- 

 tions, as they are, is a different matter. On the contrary, it seems obvi- 

 ously desirable that the division of parlies should take place with reference 

 to each important political question as it may arise, and that their dura- 

 tion should be determined by the duration of the controversy. And 

 hence it follows, that instead of the people of the country being divided 

 into two great hostile political organizations, determined entirely by 

 federal politics, there should be a different division of parties in State, 

 from that existing with reference to federal politics ; and again, that there 

 should be another and entirely ditferent division in counties and cities, 

 with reference to their local affairs ; and that parties thus formed should 

 be of only temporary duration. This, indeed, in view of the influence ot 

 custom and association, is hardlj"^ to be hoped for. But the evils of the 

 existing system may, to a large extent, be remedied by the increase of 

 men capable of independent thought and action, and of disregarding 

 parties, except so far as they may find them fitting instrument of attaining 

 rational political ends. 



This apparent digression has been rendered necessarj' by the necessity 

 of guarding against the fatal delusion that in practical politics, theoretical 

 principles are always to be put immediately in practice ; and, it may be 

 added, that in general the sole instrument or means by which political 

 theory is to be realized is general opinion ; which should lead and not 

 follow legislation. 



"With this caution, we will now return to the consideration of the theo- 

 retical principles that should govern the distribution of sovereign powers. 



(1) An obvious principle upon which this distribution may proceed is 

 that of locality ; which is the principle observed in the constitution of 

 federal States, where, as we have seen, the sovereign powers are divided 

 between the federal and the constituent States. The nature of this kind 

 of government has already been considered at length. Certain publicists, 

 as we have seen, deny the possibility of such a division of the sovereign 

 powers, and hence, in effect, the possibility of the federal State ; but it 

 has been shown, that this view is untenable. It may be added, now, 

 that, in view of the tendencies manifested in the history of the race, it is 

 to this character oi State that we must look as the principal instrument of 

 the advance of political civilization in the future. 



In the historical evolution of States, we observe a constant tendency 

 to the enlargement of the territory and population embraced under the 

 jurisdiction of the State. Thus, we have seen the primitive clan, or gens, 

 absorbed into the village, and this again into the ancient city, and this 

 finally by the great Roman empire ; and this has been followed by the 

 feudal States of medisEval, and the great national States of modern times ; 

 and, it is to be apprehended, that this tendency unless modified may go 

 on, unchecked, to results not now anticipated, (p) Of the several classes 

 of States thus evolved, we may take two as representative types ; namely, 



