324 



liUion, the separate States, which are sovereign as to nearly all the great 

 interests of society, are in a position to reform their political organizations, 

 free from all fear of foreign interference ; and hence, that they present 

 the most appropriate and hopeful fields for the operation of political 

 reform. 



With these observations upon the federal State, we pass to the con- 

 sideration of the distribution of sovereign powers in the government of 

 each State. 



(2) The first great division of powers to be considered, is that between 

 tlie ordinary government and the constituent electorate. This distinction 

 is more or less ignored, or, at least, its significance misunderstood, by 

 European publicists ; but it is clearly marked out, in this country, by our 

 actual constitutional practice. With us, as is expressed in the phrase, the 

 sovereignty of the people, the electorate is regarded as supreme, or, in 

 other words, sovereign ; but, in asserting this proposition, it must always 

 be understood that its power is limited, as is all other political power, by 

 the principles of right. 



With regard to the composition of the electorate, or, in other words, the 

 qualifications of electors, I know of no principle that can be asserted as 

 universally true. We have adopted, practically, that of universal suf- 

 frage, and the rule of the majority ; but with regard to the former, it is 

 admitted by all, that a certain degree of political civilization is required in 

 order to make the principle practically efticient ; and we may therefore 

 assume that the doctrine of universal suffrage does not assert a natural 

 and inalienable right, but that it is to be regarded, among people of sufli- 

 cient political virtue and intelligence, as the best practicable solution of 

 the question. 



With regard to the rule of the majority, as existing under our present 

 political organization, our approral must be even less unqualified. The 

 existing operation of this principle may be considered in two aspects ; 

 viz., as to its theoretical, and as to lis, practical working. With regard to 

 the former, the legislative power — in which the other powers of the gov- 

 ernment have been largely absorbed — is supposed to be exercised by our 

 representatives. Our government, therefore, is, in theory, though not ac- 

 cording to the common notion, an oligarchy, consisting of our chosen rep- 

 resentatives ; but this, in fact, is not the case. The rulers of the country 

 are, in reality, the majority of the representatives ; and these represent, 

 not the whole of the electorate, but simply the majority of the electorate ; 

 and the minority, in many States, as, for instance, in the Southern States, 

 and in the Eastern States, with one exception, and in most of the old 

 Northwestern States, are as completely and permanently disfranchised as 

 though they lived under the Czar of Russia. But, practically, even this 

 is not realized. The actual constituency of the representatives does not 

 consist of the electors generally, or even of the electors assembled in con- 

 ventions, but of the professional politicians and party leaders ; so that we 

 are really living under an oligarchy, constantly alternating from the 

 political managers of one party to those of the other. 



