332 



should have the power of making and executing the laws, and another, or the repre- 

 sentatives of another, the unlimited authority of preventing their enactment and 

 execution, if not wholly impracticable, at least too feeble to stand the shocks to which 

 all governments are subject; and would, therefore, predict its speedy dissolution, 

 after a distracted and inglorious career. 



" How different from the result ! Instead of distraction, it proved to be the bond of 

 concord and harmony ; instead of weakness, of une<iualed strength, and, instead of a 

 short and inglorious career, one of great length and immortal glory. It moderated the 

 conflicts between the orders; harmonized their interests and blended them into one; 

 substituted devotion to country in the place of devotion to particular orders; called 

 forth the united strength and energy of the whole, in the hour of danger ; raised 

 to power the wise and patriotic ; elevated tlie Roman name above all others ; extended 

 her authority and dominion over the greater part of the then known world, and trans- 

 mitted the influence of her laws and institutions to the present day. Had the opposite 

 counsel prevailed at this critical juncture ; had an appeal been made to arms instead of 

 to concession aud compromise, Rome, instead of l)eing what she afterwards became, 

 would, in all probability, have been as inglorious, and as little known to posterity, as the 

 insignificant States which surrounded her, whose names and existence would have been 

 long since consigned to oblivion, had they not been preserved in the history of her con- 

 quests of them. But for the wise course then adopted, it is not improbable— whichever 

 order might have prevailed— that she would have fallen under some cruel and petty 

 tyrant, and finally been conquered by some of the neighboring States or by tlie Carthage- 

 niaus or the Gauls. To the fortunate turn whicli events then took, she owed her un- 

 bounded sway and imperishable renown. 



"It is true, that the tribunate, after raising her to a height of power and prosperity 

 never before equaled, finally became one of the instruments by which her liberty was 

 overthrown ; but it was not until she became exposed to new dangers, growing out of 

 increase of wealth and the great extent of her dominions, against which the tribunate 

 furnished no guards. Its original object was the protection of the plebeians against 

 oppression aud abuse of power on the pan of the patricians. This it thoroughly 

 accomplished, but it had no power to protect the people ol tlie numerous and wealthy 

 conquered countries from being plundered by consuls and proconsuls. Nor could it 

 prevent the plunderers from using the enormous wealth, which they extorted from the 

 impoverished and ruined provinces, to corrupt aud delmse the people; nor arrest the 

 formation of parties— irrespective of the old division of patricians aud plebeians— having 

 no other object than to obtain the control of the government lor the purpose of plunder. 

 Against these formidable evils, her constitution furnished no adequate security. Under 

 their baneful iufluence, the possession of the government became the object of the most 

 violent conflicts ; not between patricians and plebeians, but between profligate and cor- 

 rupt factions. They continued with increasing violence, until finally Rome sunk, as 

 must every community under similar circumstances, beneath the strong grasp, the 

 despotic rule of the chieftain of the successful party— tlie sad but only alternative which 

 remained to prevent universal violence, confusion and anarchy." 



In further illustration of the principle stated in the text the Slavic principle may be 

 referred to, that requires unanimity to give validity to a political act. This is referred to 

 by Mr. Bluntschli as practicable only in small and entirely homogeneous communities ; 

 but it is well known to have been exemplified on a large scale in the Polish goverijment. 

 I do not, of course, recommend the principle as applied in that governmi-nt, but it 

 worked fairly well for over two hundred years. 



It is thus explained, and also a similar institution of another people, by Mr. Callioun 

 {Disquisition on Government) : 



" It is, then, a great error to suppose that the government of the concurrent nnijority is 

 impracticable or that it rests on a feeble foundation. History furnishes many examples 

 of such governments, and among them, one, in which the principle was carried t-o an 

 extreme that would be thought impracticable had it never existed. I refer lo that of 

 Poland. In this it was carried to such an extreme that, in the election of her kings, the 

 concurrence or acquiescence of every individual of the nobles and gentry present in an 



