THE INDIA RUBBER WORLD 



[July 1, 1917. 



THE JUDGE'S CHARGE IN THE BLITZ CONSPIRACY 



SUIT. 



AXXl'LXCiiMiCXT was made in The I.nuia Ivi msER World. 

 Jiiiio 1, 1917, of tile decision in favor of the defendants in 

 the case of Ludwif; Blitz v. The Rubber Central Committee of 

 The Rubber Association of America. The charge of Supreme 

 Court Justice Cropsey is of such interest, liowever, because of 

 its clarity, that we publish it in full herewith. 



After the customary explanatory remarks and congratulations 

 to the plaintiff and defendants. Judge Cropsey said : 



The claim of the plaintiff, in a general sense, is this : That 

 these defendants conspired together unlawfully and wrongfully 

 to put the plaintiff out of business, either wholly or in part. 

 That is the claim stated in a few w'ords. 



The law of conspiracy is this, so far as it is necessary to apply 

 it, particularly in this trial : A conspiracy necessarily means that 

 two or more people are involved in it, because no one person 

 can conspire with himself. The word itself indicates that there 

 is some gathering together of some interests, more than one. So 

 two or more people may conspire. If it is to be a conspiracy 

 which may be the basis of any action, for instance, such as 

 claimed in this case, the conspiracy would have to be to do some- 

 thing that was unlawful or to do something by unlawful means. 

 But 1 need not go any further. I think, in the definition of the 

 statement of the law. because of the very frank and fair conces- 

 sion of defendants' counsel, who said to you tliat if you found 

 that these defendants, or any of them, conspired together wrong- 

 fully and unlawfully to put this plaintiff out of business or to 

 injure him in liis business, that then the plaintiff would be en- 

 titled to a verdict. That is fairly and frankly said, and that is 

 the law anyhow. So I will not go any further into the discus- 

 sion of the law on that phase of it. 



I will try to point out to you now wherein the plaintif? claims 

 the defendants did act wrongfully and unlawfully, and then leave 

 it to you to say whether or not that is so. 



Before 1 do that, however, let me say this to you : It appears 

 in proof here that this plaintiff has not gotten, at least through 

 the channels that he usually got it, import rubber since some 

 time in May or June. 1915. But let me caution you, please, that 

 when you go out to deliberate you try not to arrive at a result 

 merely from that particular fact. Because that fact of itself 

 does not establish anything that is of real vitality to this case. 

 In otlier words, the mere fact that he has not gotten rubber does 

 not show, unless you know something more, whether these de- 

 fendants were wrongfidly and unlawfully responsible for his 

 failure to get it. So do not go out and just say, "Well, he did 

 not get it, and therefore he ought to have a verdict." That would 

 not be the law. That is the reason I am saying that to you. 



I think it is conceded by the defendants, but whether it is or 

 not, I think there is very little dispute about it, if any, that he 

 has not been able to get any rubber : but the defendants very 

 strenuously and seriously and earnestly dispute that they were 

 in any way responsible for this failure. That is the reason I 

 have pointed out to you that the mere fact that he has not .got 

 it is not to serve any purpose at all e.Kcept just the one, namely, 

 that he did not get it. Vou are going to find out why he did 

 not get it, and see whether or not these defendants are respon- 

 sible for it. 



The plaintilT claims these several things as the basis of his 

 action. You understand that I am only stating his claim. I am 

 not stating anvthing that I think is true or the fact, but I am 

 only going to state both claims, that is all. The plaintiff claims 

 that the defendants w'rongfully and unlawfully conspired together 

 to get control of the rubber trade ; that in pursuance of that 

 conspiracy they promulgated rules or regulations, and prescribed 

 that everybody would have to, comply with those rules and re.gu- 

 lations who wanted to get import rubber, import rubber at least 

 from the British domains ; that they also notified the trade that 

 those who did not comply with these rules and regulations would 

 not be permitted to get such import rubber, and could not do 

 business in that line of trade. The plaintiff also claims that the 

 defendants falsely accused the plaintiff of a non-compliance with 

 their rules and regulations, that they delayed him in getting some 

 of his shipments through, and that finally they refused to per- 

 mit or to release other shipments, or permit him to get other 

 shipments through. 



I think, while that is stated rather summarily, that this state- 

 ment covers at least in the main the claims that the plaintiff 

 makes. 



The defendants sav that they did not do any of these things 

 at all tliat the plaintiff claims against them. The defendants sav 



that they did not conspire to control the rubber trade; but, on 

 the contrary, they were trying to foster the rubber trade, to 

 encourage it, to help it do business; and the only way the)' could 

 do that was to try to get everybody to live up to the reBulalii>ns 

 so as to minimize the possibility of the British Government abso- 

 lutely cutting off tlie supply of crude rubber in this country. Vou 

 understand that 1 am stating the defendants' claim. '1 he de- 

 fendants say that while they may liave adopted some minor rules 

 and regulations tliat the rules and regulations wUich were adopted 

 and of which the plaintiff complains in his complaint were pro- 

 mulgated and enforced by the British authorities and not bv 

 these defendants at all ; that they may have been merely the 

 vehicle, if you please, through whicli they were sent out or made 

 known to the trade; but that they were not the factors in pre- 

 scribing what they should be. The defendants say that they 

 did not falsely accuse this plaintiff of anything, that they never 

 accused him of anything, either falsely or otherwise; that tliey 

 did not delay any of his shipments ; and that they never did 

 anything that in any way prevented him from getting his ship- 

 ments through ; but that whatever delay there was in the last 

 orders, and whatever prevention there was finally, was due solely 

 to the acts of the British Consul, or his representatives, and not 

 through any acts of tliese defendants. 



I have, I think, generally stated the claims of the defendants. 

 I do not mean, when I have tried to state briefly, as I have, the 

 claims of both sides, I do not mean to exclude anything else. 

 If there are other claims, I do not w-ant to exclude them. That 

 is not my purpose. My object is merely to try to simplify this 

 case if I can for your determination — not that you could not 

 handle it anyhow, but merely to make your labors easier, if I 

 can point out the real issues that are said to exist, so you may 

 give towards your verdict your thought and attention and ulti- 

 mately decide which side to give your verdict to. 



These are the claims of the two sides. There is a little more 

 of amplification, I could perhaps say, about each of these. I will 

 try merely to amplify them a little, without intending to express 

 the slightest opinion one way or the other about the two sides of 

 each of these claims, except in so far as perhaps the evidence may 

 he uncontradicted concerning it. If it is. perhaps I will men- 

 tion it. 



The first thing is whether the defendants conspired to control 

 the rubber trade, or whether they did not. The defendants have 

 told you what they were trying to do. and why they were trying 

 to do it. 



It is a fact, apparently conceded, and even if it is not con- 

 ceded, I think it is a fact anyhow, that there were misstatements 

 made in some of these circular letters that these defendants sent 

 out. V'hether they were of importance or not, I am not saying. 

 But the plaintiff claims that there were misstatements of facts in 

 these circular letters. Perhaps the principal claim he makes is 

 the one which said that the Rubber Club of America was the 

 trustee of the British Government, in reference to this rubber 

 matter, and that they had carte blanche practically to carry the 

 whole thing through : and some other charges of that kind. I 

 think it is conceded that these statements were at least inac- 

 curate. They were not truthful. But does it matter? I do not 

 mean by that question to say I think it does not matter either. 

 I only want you to get the real purport of these things. Is it 

 important whether those were true or not? If it is important, 

 then you will have to find out whv it is important. If it is not 

 important, you will pay just as little attention to it as its lack of 

 importance justifies. Is it important w'ith j'ou, these false state- 

 ments? Their purpose and intent in doing that, of course, would 

 have a bearing in deciding whether or not it was an important 

 thing in this case. 



As I understand the claim of tlie plaintiff it is that the de- 

 fendants is that while these statements were untrue, that they 

 to get control of the rubber trade, and get it into their own 

 hands, so that they could do as they liked about it. 



On the other hand, as I understand it, the claim of the de- 

 fendants is that while these statements were untrue, that they 

 were made with the idea rather of not getting any advantage 

 over anybody, but trying to impress the trade with the belief 

 that they really had to do what these regulations prescribed in 

 order to protect everybody in the trade against the possibility 

 of a calamity almost, it might be said, of having this rubber sup- 

 ply entirely cut off by the British Government. 



I think that is, in a word, the two claims on that point. 



What do you think is the fact about it? 



If course, if the latter claim is true, if that is the only reason 

 that they did it. then the false statements are not of anv real 

 moment. If they did it for the other purpose, it may be of some 

 moment. But. of course, if it is, even then it would not estab- 

 lish the plaintiff's main claim, but it would be a factor to be 

 considered in connection with the other proof. 



