July 1, 1917. 



THE INDIA RUBBER WORLD 



595 



I think it is undisputed in the case that these defendants did 

 not prescribe the main rules, or what I call the main rules. I 

 mean the rules in regard to the necessity for the written guaran- 

 tees of both the importer and manufacturer. I think it is ad- 

 mitted, or even if it is not admitted, I think it is undisputed, 

 that these defendants did not prescribe those rules and regula- 

 tions. Those were prescribed by the British authorities in Lon- 

 don, as the uncontradicted proof in this case shows. So as to 

 that part of it, at least, there can be no criticism of these de- 

 fendants. As to how they may have attempted to enforce them, 

 we will come to a little later. But as to the whole formation or 

 creation and promulgation of these rules, I think the defendants 

 had no part under the undisputed proof. 



With the promulgation of these rules, the plaintiff claims that 

 the defendants practically told the people that if they did not 

 comply with the rules, they could not get import rubber. They 

 did tell them that. I think the undisputed proof in the case bears 

 out that statement, because the British authorities said that 

 if they would not comply with these rules, you cannot get rubber, 

 and therefore anybody who did not comply with these rules, 

 would not get it, 



Vou cannot predicate any charge against the defendants on 

 that statement, because the statement that they made to that 

 effect seems to have been required by the regulations of the Brit- 

 ish Government. 



Then the plaintiff claims that these defendants falsely accused 

 the plaintiff of a non-compliance with some of the regulations. 

 I do not get clearly at all the point the plaintiff' bases that claim 

 on — that they falsely accused the plaintiff of non-compliance. 

 As I get it, the claim of the plaintiff is that when he went in 

 there, and there was some discussion about whetlier he had com- 

 plied with these regulations, that he made his claim tliat he had 

 complied with them as he understood them. That is how I un- 

 derstand the plaintiff's claim. 1 do not understand that he says 

 that the defendants in any way accused him of violating the 

 rules. I mean not at the time preliminary to this trial. But if 

 there is any such claim, of course, you can consider it, because 

 that is one of the charges tliat the plaintiff makes in his com- 

 plaint upon which this cause of action arises. 



The plaintiff also says that the defendants delayed putting 

 through his shipments, and finally ultimately refused to pass any 

 more. About that, there is no dispute that he could not get any 

 more through. 1 say that perhaps rather unreservedly and un- 

 qualifiedly, notwithstanding Mr. 'V'orhis' testimony or demeanor, 

 rather, that may have been a little uncertain about it. But I 

 understand the defendants do not dispute really that they did 

 not put any more of these things through. If there is any dis- 

 pute about that, I will hear counsel, and he can take an excep- 

 tion. 1 do not intend to be unfair in the statement. I am only 

 trying to simplify it and get it down to what I think there is 

 really a dispute abont. I do not understand that tliere is anv 

 real substantial dispute about the fact that the plaintiff could 

 not get any more of his import rubber throu.gh. and that there 

 was some delay. How much, I do not know. Whether it is 

 important or not may not appear either ; Init that there was some 

 delay in gettin.g through his last three shipments, I think there 

 is no dispute about. Whether it is important or nr)t, I do not 

 say.. 



The question on these last two considerations is tliis : Was 

 the delay, whatever it amounted to, and was the final situation 

 which now prevents the plaintiff from getting any import rublier 

 from British domains, in any way due to the wron.gful and un- 

 lawful acts of these defendants? I w-ant to emphasize those two 

 adjectives, "wrongful" and "unlawful," because it has to be acts 

 of that kind and character, and you have got to find that there 

 were acts of that kind and character before under any possibility 

 this plaintiff is entitled to a verdict. To put it in another waj' : 

 Tf these defendants in good faith, without any wrong motive, 

 without any harmful intent or purpose, if they did something or 

 said somethin.g or failed to do something which in anv way had 

 tlie effect of cutting off the plaintiff, even if they did that, there 

 would be no liability, because the liability in this case is charged 

 not unon an unintentional wron.g. not uuon something that hap- 

 pened wh'ch nobody sought to bring about ; but it is charged 

 upon a wilful, wrongful and unlawful attempt and undertaking 

 to 1>ring about the result that has been brought about. So vou 

 see that even it you find that these defendants had a ri=rt — •'nd 

 I do not assinne you will find that these defendants had a part 

 in liringing abnut the final result, that would not entitle the 

 plaintiff to a verdict unless you found that that part which the 

 defendants took was taken wilfullv. deliiierately. witli the inten- 

 tion of putting this plaintiff out of l)Usiness, or crippling him in 

 his business. 



Just to illustrate what I mean by tliat let me say this. There 

 is some proof here, in fact, T think it is undisputed in the proof, 

 that the British representative, Mr. Broderick, who said he put 



the final embargo on this — that is not the best word to use. be- 

 cause that is mi.xed with the Government embargo — but who put 

 the final veto on the right of this plaintiff to get any more crude 

 rubber — he said that he never knew of the plaintiff's connection 

 with this rubber on this "Atlantic" except as he got the informa- 

 tion of it from the defendants acting through Mr. Wilson. I 

 want you to, if you will, bear in mind what I have just stated 

 before, and see how that fact of itself should be applied. The 

 information upon wdiich Mr. Broderick acted, he said he got 

 through Mr. Wilson. But that does not show that this plaintiff 

 has any cause of action, because if Mr. Wilson went to Mr. 

 Broderick at the request of Mr. Blitz, and told him, Mr. Brod- 

 erick, what Mr. Blitz had asked him should be told, why, of 

 course, you would see in a moment without even my saying it 

 that then there could not be any basis for a liability against the 

 defendants predicated upon that fact. To go further. If Mr. 

 Wilson went to Mr. Broderick not merely to tell what Mr. Blitz 

 had asked him to tell ; l)Ut if he went there with no wrong 

 motive, if he went there without any unlawful purpo.se, without 

 any wrongful intention of hurting Mr. Blitz at all, and told 

 wdiat he knew about Blitz's connection with the rubber on the 

 ".\tlantic" ; and even though tliat was the cause of Mr. Broderick 

 cutting off Mr. Blitz's supply, still that would be no basis of a 

 liability, because you will bear in mind that the acts of the 

 defendants for which they can be held liable are only those 

 which were done wrongfully and unlawfully. If they have acted 

 rightfully and if they have acted with a good motive, there is no 

 possible liability. On the other hand, if they have even acted 

 thoughtlessly or carelessly or even inconsiderately, there is no 

 liability so long as their lack of caution or lack of consideration 

 was not due to any wrongful, wilful, intentional desire to harm 

 this plaintiff. 



I hope I have made that clear, because that is the gist of the 

 case. The decision in the case rests upon your determination of 

 whether or not there was anv wrongful or unlawful acts on the 

 part of these defendants that helped to bring about this result. 

 Any other act of the defendants that was not wrongful or unlaw- 

 ful is not an act upon which you can find a verdict for the plain- 

 tiff, even though it may have been the cause of producing the 

 very unfortunate situation that tlie plaintiff now finds himself in. 



I have tried to clarify just what the real issues are in this 

 case. If I have done so, I am glad, because that ought to be and 

 is the object of the Court in charging the jury. 



Just let me say to you a few other things, that you will not 

 misunderstand either. There lias been some talk in this case 

 about nationality. I observed, when there was the first men- 

 tion of that in this case, that that had nothing to do with the 

 case. I am only saying it to you, because I believe it is my duty 

 under the law to say it to you, that if any verdict should be 

 found in this, or any other case, either for or against a plaintiff 

 or for or against a defendant because of his nationality, why it 

 would be a disastrous situation and a result that would bring 

 discredit alike upon the jurors who found it and upon the county 

 that they represented. Nationality has no part in our courts of 

 justice. We are proud of the fact that people can come into 

 our courts and get justice, no matter who they are. 



While I have said that, let me say this: That if you feel that 

 anybody in this case has attempted to import into the case any 

 question of nationality, and if you feel perhaps a not unnatural 

 resentment that that has been done, let me say to you very 

 earnestly to be very careful to see that if you have such resent- 

 ment that it does not operate against the party who you think 

 may have attempted to import that question into the case. You 

 see that is just as important to do as the other thing I have 

 suggested is to do. Both are important, in order that vou will 

 get the right result, a result that is not influenced by resentment, 

 or prejudice, or passion, or consideration, or sympathy, or any- 

 thing else : but a result which is determined simply and solely 

 by the truth of the case as you find it in the witnesses and in the 

 exhibits, and that wdiich rings true to your consciences. 



The question of whether or not this plaintiff intended, in buy- 

 ing this nd)ber for Kulenkampff. that it should be exported or 

 th_at_ it might not be exported, that of itself may not be a deter- 

 mining factor in the case one way or the other. It may have a 

 bearing on the case, of course, depending upon how you view- 

 it. but it may not be a determining factor. 



These defendants do not claim that they failed or refused to 

 do anything for this plaintiff because of his connection with the 

 Kulenkampff affair. They contend that they did al! they could 

 notvvitlistanding his connection witli it. no matter what it may 

 have been ; and that in all tliey did they tried f« keep him in 

 .good favor or get him back in good favor with the British Gov- 

 ernment, not as I understand it. because of any altruistic motive 

 altogether either, not because they were interested in Blitz, as T 

 understand it. but from a very practical and. in a sense, humanly 

 selfish motive, as I understand it. that they did not want to take 



