INFORMATION RELATING TO CREDIT 71 



Reunion. — The Bank of Reunion has evinced since the very begin- 

 ning of the war a remarkable spirit of initiative, taking steps without wait- 

 ing for an}' sort of impulsion, whatever might be the gravity of the risks 

 involved. 



In the first place this bank notified the governor of the colony as early 

 as I August 191.-J, that is before war had been declared, that it would meet 

 any needs which might arise if the colon}^ shoirld be isolated by the inter- 

 ruption of communications with Paris. This undertaking had reference 

 not only to the needs of manufacturers, planters and cultivators of every 

 description, but also to those of the colon}', even if it should com.e to be 

 deprived of an important part of its receipts b}'' the anticipated reduction 

 in the revenue from customs dues and tolls. The bank offered these ser- 

 vices to the colony spontaneously and thus gave proof of its desire not to 

 allow the general interest to suffer. 



Subsequentl}', when it had advertised in all the newspapers of the 

 colom^ that it would continue to work as in the past, it decided to grant 

 advances on nierchandise at the rate of 6 per cent. — a rate less bj' i per 

 cent, than that on which the Bank of France then made advances on the 

 best security — to all large and small planters, manufacturers and business 

 men of every description. This rate, low as it was in the existing circums- 

 tances, has been yet further reduced since November 1Q15 to 5 per cent, 

 for loans on merchandise for export and on most imported wares, notably 

 rice, that is on almost all merchandise. 



The bank has done even better in the matter of loans on harvests, 

 which are one of the most risky of banking transactions and are effected 

 onl}^ by the banks of the old colonies. In their case it has maintained the 

 5 per cent, rate which is so favourable to local agriculture, and is less by 

 I per cent, than that now charged by the Bank of France on the safest tran- 

 sactions. 



Further, since it reasonabl}^ anticipated from the time of the outbreak 

 of hostilities a verj- considerable rise in the price of sugar, the principal ar- 

 ticle of export, it recommended ^all producers, whether large or small, not 

 to sell at the prices current when the war began. It advised small produc- 

 ers to form themselves into groups in order to receive the loan which it 

 would grant them on pledged goods, and to incur responsibility in the name 

 of one of their number, thus avoiding the payment of registration and stamp- 

 ing dues (three francs a deed). Finally, since the bank believed that the 

 exploitation of persons of small means by speculators must be avoided at 

 all costs, it refused to make certain advances on pledges which would have 

 had a purely speculative character; and shorth' afterwards organized at 

 its own cost a service of information by cable, thus apprising the popula- 

 tion of the prices which the different colonial products were fetching in 

 Paris. 



The loans which the bank granted on the products of the colony in 

 these conditions rose from 5,915,000 francs in 1913-1914 to 10,072,600 

 francs in 1914-1915, that is to say thej- were doubled. Between 1913-1914 

 and T915-1916 the loans on imported merchandise rose from 3,555.000 



