Cope.] 4 Jb [Oct. 4, 



relations of position which faitlifully reproduce the primitive form of con- 

 sciousness when consciousness recurs in them. This fact indicates that 

 ideation is a constructive agent, a proposition wliich receives support from 

 the history of animal evolution in general. It must be remarked, how- 

 ever, that the forms of ideation differ much in their constructive power. 

 Emotional ideation is far less constructive than the intellectual, and of the 

 intellectual faculties, the rational is the most persistent. 



Ideation, in the wide sense, falls into the three classes indicated by Kant, 

 those of the intellect, the emotions and the will. In the process of evolu- 

 tion of animals the faculties of each of these classes have played an active 

 part in adapting the individual to the environment ; in changing its en- 

 vironment ; and in directing the movements of its organs; thus affecting 

 its structure through use and disuse. As the primitive motive in all ac- 

 tion, we may assign the emotions in their various forms, as the appetites, 

 the tastes, and the affections ; the emotions proper constituting the ex- 

 treme expression of the class. The manner in which these execute their 

 behests and indeed the decision as to whether they shall find executive ex- 

 pression or not, is determined by the intelligence. The act of execution 

 is the will. On a purely physiological explanation of the relation between 

 stimulus and consequent act, the word will is superfluous. But if there 

 be any purely mental process involved which cannot be explained on 

 dynamical principles, then the term will has an important significance. 

 The mental activities then which have so influenced the process of 

 animal evolution (and perhaps other evolution) fall under the two heads 

 of motive and executive faculties, and the motives to action are either 

 emotional or intelligent ; or, as is usually the case, of the two in mutual 

 interaction. 



At this point we at once reach the ancient question of realism and ideal- 

 ism. We are confronted with the crux of human thought, whether there 

 be any forms of ideation which are not representative ; and also whether 

 the forms of ideation determine the properties of matter, or whether they 

 are themselves determined by the properties of matter ; and therefore 

 whether the presentative forms, or the sensations, reveal to us a real 

 universe not of our own making, or not. The answer to these questions 

 constitutes our knowledge of the relations of mind to matter. On these 

 depend the most stupendous events. These are nothing less than the 

 persistence or extinction of mind, both tliat of finite beings like our- 

 selves, but also the extinction of all mind. If mind have no sufficient 

 control over matter, then the dissipation of energy, which inheres in the 

 the processes of matter, must end in the extinction of mind. If on the con- 

 trary, mind has a sufficient control over matter, then we must view it as a 

 constructive principle at work, to Avhich the integration of matter and 

 dissipation of energy are but secondary or complementary. 



Hitherto the nature of cognition has been chiefly considered in the 

 realist idealist discussion, but the nature of will is eqitally involved in it. 

 Free will is in some sense a priori will or unconditioned will. I propose 



