Cope.] 4 Jo [Oct. 4, 



harmonize them. And there is indeed truth, as usual, on both sides of 

 the question, which will form, when harmonized, a consistent whole, and 

 a true philosophy. 



The truth of realistic doctrine is demonstrated not only by the fact 

 of evolution, but by the general result of scientific research. The inde- 

 structibility of matter and the conservation of energy have been demon- 

 strated in a vast number of instances. If our knowledge of the vai'ied 

 properties of matter is defective, the defect is growing rapidly less, and no 

 limit can be put upon our progress in this direction. But apart from this, 

 it is safe to infer what we do not know of the properties of matter 

 from what we know, very much as we can infer the general characters of 

 the lost parts of the anatomy of a vertebrate animal from its skeleton 

 alone. Moreover, the mind is as capable of perceiving disorder as order. 

 It appreciates the disorder of a wrecked building as readily as the order 

 of increments of wave-lengths, of chemical equivalents, or of cusps 

 on the tooth of a mammal ; and allhougli the knowledge of order and of 

 disorder is organized in the subjective, the order we observe in nature is 

 not in us, but it is in nature ; it is objective, and not subjective. It is the 

 cause of our perceptions, and our perceptions are not the cause of it. 



What are the truths of idealism ? Kant, while admitting the validity of 

 sense perceptions, in opposition to pure idealism, asserted that they are 

 only comprehensible to us through a subjective and a priori form of 

 thought, and that we understand objects in accordance with that form, 

 and not as they are in themselves. And first of all the forms of thouglit, 

 those of space and time, constitute the basis of our interpretations of 

 Nature as we see it. It is this qualified idealism of Kant which tlie evo- 

 lutionist needs chiefly to consider. 



The question has been often debated. Are these fundamental forms of 

 thought a posteriori or a priori ; are they known by experience or are they 

 deeper than experience ? If evolution be true they are only known to 

 man, as Bain asserts, by experience. But the question again arises, Is the 

 human mind all there is of mind in the universe ? To say the least of it, 

 such a view is open to serious question ; and by most rational persons a 

 negative reply, based on probabilities, would be promptly given. To my 

 own understanding the restriction of mind to this speck called the Earth 

 is highly improbable, and any assertion to that effect appears to be with-, 

 out sufficient basis. There being doubt then as to this point, we are com- 

 pelled to examine again the qualities of mind itself to see whether there 

 is any ground for a belief in its possession of a priori qualities. In tliis 

 quest from an evolutionary standpoint we can have but one criterion. 

 We cannot assume that any of them can be developed in men without 

 experience, but we can ascertain whether any of them are in themselves 

 eqvally triw in the absence of experience of an objective U7iiverse, as with such 

 experience. Such faculties, if possible, could be predicated in varying de- 

 grees of minds dwelling in environments differing from those of this planet, 

 and of minds which might have existed before evolutions should have 



