1889.1 ^^1 [Cope. 



The relation of these several functions of mintl to its objective or mate- 

 rial basis is both destructive and constructive. Physiological science and 

 common experience show that they cannot be performed witliout the 

 usual decomposition of matter and dissipation of energy. But evolution 

 shows that they have also done something else of a diametrically opposite 

 character. In the course of ages they have built up on the Earth, by suc- 

 cessive increments, a mechanism whose function has been that of con- 

 tinuously developing mind. And this continuous development of mind 

 means successive increase of control over the environment ; in short, the 

 development of a control by mind of matter. How this can have been 

 accomplished may be considered in the following pages which treat of the 

 will. 



II. The Will. 



The will has two aspects from which it maybe viewed, the physical and 

 the metaphysical. As the link between thought and action it represents 

 the contact of the one with the other. If all thought be mechanical, then 

 will does not differ from other links in the chain of causation. If, on the 

 other hand, the universe be a psychic product, will is again but a passing 

 phase of the stream of thought. But if mind be an att«ibute of matter, 

 whose existence depends on its own success in resisting a tendency to 

 extinction, then will is something definite, which presents the two aspects 

 already referred to. The will, as the executive power of the mind, is 

 either free, or it is determined by antecedent mental conditions ; or as a 

 function of matter, it is free, or it is determined by present physical con- 

 ditions. Which of these propositions is true is the second question of the 

 ages. 



On the metaphysical side the will is determined by preexistent motives, 

 or appears to be. The situation is such that the negative of this statement 

 cannot be clearly proven. A will which acts without motives Is incom- 

 prehensible. Motiveless acts cannot be regarded as mental. It has been 

 suggested that there is an opportunity for metaphysical freedom of will in 

 situations and under circumstances which are prior to experience. But 

 even in cases where there is a defect of experience, an almost incon- 

 ceivable condition, the imagination will furnish motives. It is impossible 

 to escape metaphysical determinism. 



The physical action of the will is less simple. In the performance by an 

 animal of a reflex act, we believe that the act is the direct result of a stimu- 

 lus which passes into a mechanism so constructed as to release energy in 

 the direction of, and to the end to perform, the act in question. Into such 

 a process there enters no distinct element called will. In an animal pos- 

 sessed of intelligence, to ever so limited an amount, the direction of an 

 act not reflex, is due to the presence of consciousness in the performance. 

 This consciousness is generally supposed to exercise a directive influence 

 until the movement has been thoroughly learned, or has become auto- 

 matic, a term which is applied to acts more nearly allied to the voluntary 



