Cope.] 504 fOct. 4, 



of tlie actor, and the effect of his acts oa society, the world, etc., and for 

 the same reasons. His acts enter other miads as motives, and the same 

 process is repeated, indefinitely. 



To repeat the proposition in a summary form. The character of an act 

 of will is derived from two factors. First, subjective, the motives already 

 existent in the mind ; second, objective, the object or end towards the ac- 

 complishment of which the act is directed. In neither the first nor the second 

 process is the law of the conservation of energy observed o/i the metaphysi- 

 cal side, though it doubtless is on the physical side. That is, in the for- 

 mation of motives there is no correlation between the reasons adopted as 

 sufficient, and the energy expended in weighing them. Secondly, there 

 is no correlation between the direction taken by the act, and the energy 

 expended in performing it. The reason for this second proposition is 

 identical with that which explains the first. The direction or object of 

 the act is also due to motives which only differ from those embraced in 

 the first proposition in their later origin in time.* 



The relation of these facts to the physiology of an act of will is" as fol- 

 lows. The stimulus to act enters the brain by the sensory channels and 

 comes, probably in the cortical cellsof the anterior lobes of the hemispheres, 

 into the structural mechanism of the intelligence. Here a mechanism 

 exists, formed under the direction of all the mental faculties of ideation, 

 from which a judgment issues. Or if the case be a new one, a rearrange- 

 ment of molecules takes place as the combined result of the old and the 

 new ideas, and a new judgment is formed. Here we have repeated the 

 primitive process of creation of ideational centres. Next, the judgment 

 furnishes the form for the outgoing act, which then repeats, on the objec- 

 tive world, including the person of the actor, the rearrangement of mat- 

 ter under its direction. Thus are modified at once, under the same judg- 

 ment, llie animal and its environment. 



The extent to which a judgment is creative, evidently depends on its 

 purity as judgment; only the "colorless judgment " is absolutely crea- 

 tive. As has been already pointed out (page 495), when discussing mem- 

 ory, the reproduction of mental function becomes more complete as we 

 approach the rational faculty, and vice versa ; it grows less as we pass 

 successively to the imagination, the emotions, and least of all as a se- 

 quence of sensations. The coincidence of this fact, with the utility of in- 

 telligence, is not accidental. And we may then conclude that the highest 

 creative power resides in exercise of a priori or formal thought, on the 

 ground of physiological economy. We may conclude that, although the will 

 is always strictly determined from the metaphysical side, it is fjee from 

 necessity on the physical side, save only that imposed by the dimensions 

 and resistance of matter. And in the coincidence of formal thought, 

 which is universal thought, with conditioned freedom of will towards 

 matter, we have the essentials of creative power, and a creative person- 

 ality. 



* American Naturalist, June, 188S, On the Relation of Will to the Conservation of 

 Energy, 



