WRIGHT— NATURE OF FOREIGN RELATIONS POWER. HI 



national commitments of this individual might radically alter the 

 constitution. They might impair national independence. They 

 might establish autocracy. Were these commitments fundamental 

 law, obligatory upon all organs of the government, the achievements 

 of centuries of battling for constitutionalism and popular sover- 

 eignty might be sacrificed by the stroke of a pen.^ 



4. The Constitutional Point of View. 



If, on the other hand, the constitutional point of view is adopted 

 in full, the situation seems even less promising. Yet illustrations 

 are not wanting. The House of Representatives resolved in 1796 

 and again in 1871 that: 



"When a treat}' stipulates regulations on an}' of the subjects submitted 

 by the Constitution to the power of Congress, it must depend for it's execu- 

 tion as to such stipulations on a law or laws to be passed by Congress; and 

 it is in the constitutional right' and duty of the House of Representatives in 

 all such cases to dehberate on the expediency or inexpediency of carrying 

 such treaty into effect and to determine and act thereon, as in their judg- 

 ment may be most conducive to the public good." <' 



Should a general opinion develop that national commitments 

 made by the proper constitutional authority and solemnized with 

 due formality might be ignored or repudiated by other organs of 

 the government because of some obscure constitutional limitation, 

 unknown to a foreign nation, the authority conducting foreign 

 relations could no longer command a hearing as the representative 



5 " Applying the principle broadly, the contention that one department of 

 the Government may in any way coerce another is a repudiation of the very 

 purpose of the division of power, and would result in the destruction of 

 that freedom under law which the Constitution aims to establish. If such 

 an attempt were for any reason successful, it would result' in the establishing 

 of an autocratic form of government. Absolutism, which the Constitution 

 was intended to prevent, might thus creep ' in through the usurpation of 

 power by a single department, or even by a single officer of the Government. 

 There could be no greater offense against the Constitution than this, and 

 public opinion should unite in condemning even the suggestion of it." D. J. 

 Hill, Present Problems in Foreign Policy, N. Y., 1919, p. 163. 



6 Annals, 4th Cong., ist Sess., p. 771; Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., I5t 

 Sess., p. 835; Wharton, Int. Law Digest, 2: 19. 



