WRIGHT— NATURE OF FOREIGN RELATIONS POWER. 113 



visional until they have been endorsed by other organs of the 

 government, whose cooperation is necessary for their execution.^^ 



6. Relation of Law and Understandings. 



The writer believes that a comprehensive legal theory of the 

 control of foreign relations must give equal weight to the powers 

 and responsibilities derived from both constitutional law and inter- 

 national law. But in constructing such a theory, he has found 

 himself forced to take account of understandings of the kind 

 mentioned. He believes these understandings furnish the true 

 explanation of the functioning of all systems for controlling foreign 

 relations and especially of that in the United States. Without 

 them a constitutional deadlock or an international breach of faith 

 would be probable at every important international transaction. 



7. Constitutional Understandings. 



The constitutional understandings are based on the distinction 

 between the possession of a power and discretion in the exercise of 

 that power. The law of the constitution decides what organs of 

 the government possess the power to perform acts of international 

 significance and to make valid international commitments, but 

 the understandings of the constitution decide how the discretion or 

 judgment, implied from the possession of power, ought to be ex- 

 ercised in given circumstances.^^ The powers given by law to 

 various organs often overlap. Even more often, two or more 

 organs must exercise their powers in cooperation in order to achieve 

 a desired end. In such circumstances, were it not for understand- 

 ings, deadlocks would be chronic. The law is the mechanism, the 

 understandings the oil that permit it to run smoothly. 



8. International Understandings. 



International understandings are based on the same distinction 

 as constitutional understandings and are often referred to as 

 comity or imperfect rights under international law. " Our obliga- 

 tions to others," says Vattel, " are always imperfect when the 



^1 Wright, Am. Jl. of Int. Law, 10: 710; and infra, sec. 39. 

 ^2 Dicey, op. cit., p. 418. 



