WRIGHT— POSITION OF FOREIGN RELATIONS 117 



have habitually exercised diplomatic protection of their nationals 

 or have insisted that permission be given them to establish extra- 

 territorial courts for deciding cases in which their nationals are 

 defendant.^ 



II. Tlie Representative Authority Under International Law. 



More important for our purposes, however, is the requirement 

 of international law that states maintain a definite authority to 

 which foreign states may complain of violations of international law 

 and from which they may expect satisfaction on the basis of that law 

 alone. This requirement appears to be a necessary deduction from 

 the accepted principle that under international law states are re- 

 sponsible as units® and that this responsibility is unaffected by 



tlie maintenance of their rights." Mr. Webster, Secretary of State, to 

 Chevalier d'Argaiz, Spanish Minister, June 2, 1842, Moore, Digest, 2 : 5. 

 See also Borchard, Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad, 1915, p. 

 213, 335; Moore, Digest, 6: 695. The obligation to establish courts punish- 

 ing offenses against international law was recognized by Congress before the 

 Constitution (See Wright, Enforcement of Int. Law, p. 221) and is recog- 

 nized in the Constitution (Art. i, sec. 2, cl. 10). The obligation of a bel- 

 ligerent to establish prize courts is especially well recognized. " Neutral 

 states have a right to demand ex debito juditicc that there be courts for the 

 administration of international law sitting in the belligerent countries." 

 (Phillimore, Int. Law, i: 55.) See also report of British Commission on 

 Silesian Loan controversy, 1753, American State Papers, For. Rel., i: 494; 

 Moore, Digest, 7 : 603 ; Lord Mansfield in Lindo v. Rodney 2 Doug. 613, 

 616 (1781); Lord Stowell in the Recovery Rob. 348 (1807). Diplomatic 

 discussion, however, is not necessarily excluded until such judicial remedies 

 ^re exhausted (infra, note 13). 



^ Borchard, op. cit., p. 346. 



8 Borchard, op. cit., pp. 199-201. Hall, Int. Law, 7th ed., p. 54. Wilson 

 and Tucker, op. cit., p. 45, defines a state for purposes of international law as 

 " a sovereign political unity." The Supreme Court has said : " the National 

 Government is . . . responsible to foreign nations for all violations by the 

 United States of their international obligations," U. S. of Arjona, 120 U. S. 

 479, 483. Apparent exceptions to this unity of responsibility such as federal 

 states whose constitutions permit a limited diplomatic power to the member 

 states (Germany and Switzerland) and imperial commonwealths which in 

 practice permit their self-governing colonies to exercise considerable diplo- 

 matic power (British Empire) (See Moore, Digest, i: 25; Wright, Am. Jl. 

 of Int. Law, 13 : 265) prove not to be on inspection. In these cases the 

 pozfcr of making commitments is to some extent distributed but responsi- 

 bility for their exeruiion continues unified. Thus the German Constitution 

 of 1871 made it the duty of " the Emperor to represent the Empire among 

 nations " and foreign nations have held the imperial government responsible 



