122 WRIGHT— POSITION OF FOREIGN RELATIONS 



authority exists, or where it exists but its control is so ineffective 



that it cannot in fact represent the state recognition has usually been 



withheld or regular diplomatic relations have been broken. " No 



power," says Westlake, " would willingly try to weave ties with 



a rope of sand." ^^ 



as the universal representatives of states can be considered as having inde- 

 pendently a personality under the law of nations." (Rivier, Principes du 

 droit des gens, i : 51, Moore, Digest, i : 17.) See also Phillimore, Int. 

 Law, 3d ed., i : 81 ; Sec. of State Fish, Feb. 21, 1877, Moore, Digest, i : 250. 



1^ Recognition and the maintenance of diplomatic intercourse are dis- 

 cretionary with each state, but by examining the conditions under which 

 recognition has been accorded or relations broken we can discover what 

 perfection of organization modern states actually regard as prerequisite to 

 entry into international intercourse. 



In recognizing new states, the primary consideration has been the actual 

 state of independence of a community of people occupying a definite terri- 

 tory, but as Westlake points out, " The recognizing powers must respectively 

 be satisfied that the new state gives sufiicient promise of stability in its 

 government'. No power would wilhngly try to weave ties with a rope of 

 sand." (Int. Law, i : 50.) (For practice in recognizing new states 

 see Moore, Digest, i: 74-119.) 



Thus the possession of a stable government is a prerequisite to recog- 

 nition of a state. Does it follow that if the government of a recognized 

 state dissolves or undergoes convulsions the state departs from the family 

 of nations? Publicists say not — but in practice its membership is in abeyance 

 until a new government is recognized. The nature of the recognition of a 

 new government has been much discussed, some asserting that it has no 

 place in international relations (Hall, op. cit., p. 20; Woolsey, Int. Law, p. 

 39; Twiss, Int. Law, i: 21) or is a mere formality (Goebel, Recognition 

 Policy of the U. S., Columbia University Studies in History, Economics 

 and Public Law, 66: 67) but in practice the recognition or non-recognition 

 of a government may have important results, as witness the American 

 policy toward the governments of Huerta in Mexico (1914), Tinoca in 

 Costa Rica (1916) and Lenin in Russia (1917). Practice shows that a 

 radical change in a state's constitution is a matter of international consid- 

 eration and that the new government must present prospects of reasonable 

 stability and responsibility before the state can again enter into official inter- 

 national relations. The various criteria which have been followed at 

 different times for judging of such stability and responsibility such as (i) 

 defacto control, (2) legal continuity or legitimacy, or (3) consent of the 

 members of the state need not detain us here. (For American practice 

 in recognition of new governments see Moore, i: 119-164.) 



Finally even when a recognized state has a recognized government it 

 may still be unable to maintain international relations if that government 

 presents no definite authority able to meet international responsibilities. 

 Because of this lack the United States under the Articles of Confederation 

 had difficulty in exchanging diplomatic officers with other states. Thus 



