142 WRIGHT— CONCLUSIVENESS OF THE ACTS 



the negotiators. Although these, if satisfactory, originally signified 

 an actual full power of the negotiators to bind the state within the 

 limits of their instructions, at present they are understood to mean 

 that the negotiator is vested merely with the powers of the organ 

 under whose authority he acts, usually in practice the representa- 

 tive organ. ^" Suppose the organ giving " full powers " to the 

 negotiator is the full treaty-making power of the state. It was 

 held by early publicists that in such cases the document when 

 signed bound the state and ratification became a mere form which 

 could not be refused except for the most cogent reasons. ^^ Though 

 recent opinion is less definite, yet it holds that a strong obligation to 

 ratify exists^'' and this has been the view of the United States. Thus 

 in 1802 and in 1819 the Secretary of State insisted that the Spanish 

 crown was under an absolute obligation to ratify the treaties which 

 had been made within the instructions of the negotiators acting 

 under full powers of the Crown. ^° The United States has also 



fications and the parties are responsible for a failure to take measures neces- 

 sary to put them into effect. See Wright, Am. Jl. of Int. Lazv, 10: 710 (Oct., 

 1916), Crandall, op. cit., p. 345; Anson, The Law and Custom of the Con- 

 stitution, 3d ed., Oxford, 1907, vol. 2, pt. i, p. 54. 



1''' Wheaton, International Law (Dana, ed.), pp. 2>2>7, 338; Crandall, op. 

 cit., p. 2; Moore, Digest, 5: 184, 362; Satow, Diplomatic Practice, London, 

 1917, 2: 273; Harley, Am. Jl. Int. Law, 13: 389 (July, 1919), Wright, Minn. 

 Law Rev., 4: 18. 



1^ Grotius, Dc Jure Belli ac Pads, c. 11, sec. 12; Vattel, Le Droit des 

 Gens, 2, c. 12, sec. 156; Martens, Precis des Droit de Gens, c. i, sec. 36. 



19 After citing five authorities supporting an absolute obligation to 

 ratify, thirteen for a moral obligation, eight for no obligation at all, and 

 the circumstances of ten causes celcbres in which ratification was refused, 

 Harley, loc. cit., concludes, " It would seem that the weight of opinion holds 

 that a moral obligation to ratify exists." See also Moore, Digest, 5: 187; 

 Scott, The Reports of the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907, London, 

 1917, introduction, p. xxcii; Hall, International Law (Higgins, ed.), p. 341. 



20 A claims convention signed with Spain in 1802 was rejected by the 

 Senate but on new evidence being presented, the Senate changed its mind. 

 Now, however, Spain refused to ratify. " Were it necessary," replied Sec- 

 retary Madison, " to enforce these observations by an inquiry into the 

 right of His Catholic Majesty to withhold his ratification in this case, it 

 would not be difficult to show that it is neither supported by the principles of 

 public law, nor countenanced by the examples which have been cited." Mad- 

 ison to YrujO: Oct. 15, 1804, Am. St. Pap., For. Rel., 2: 625. The con- 



