WRIGHT— LIMITATIONS UPOT^ NATIONAL POWERS. 191 



It will be noticed that the Congress is vested merely with "all 

 legislative powers herein granted " while the President and the 

 courts are vested respectively with " the executive power " and 

 "the judicial power of the United States." The mere fact 

 that a power is legislative in character does not, therefore, indicate 

 its possession by Congress unless it is specifically granted to that 

 body elsewhere in the Constitution. It has been urged, however, 

 that all powers by nature executive belong inherently to the Pres- 

 ident^ and all powers by nature judicial to the courts.^ Doubtless 

 certain inherent executive -and judicial powers and privileges, nec- 

 essary for the functioning of the organ, and for the preservation 

 of its independence, such as the executive power to remove officials* 

 and the judicial power to punish for contempts,^ exist aside from 

 express delegation, but so also do inherent legislative powers, such 

 as the power to subpoena witnesses necessary to give information 

 essential to intelligent legislation.*' The general vesting of executive 

 and judicial power cannot, therefore, be made the basis of powers 

 other than essentially inherent power. To do so would render 

 the subsequent express delegations of power to the President and 

 the courts useless verbiage. Expressis unius exclusis alteris 

 applies to the executive and judicial powers as well as the legis- 

 lative.'^ 



Aside, therefore, from its assurance of certain necessary and 

 inherent powers to each department, the theory of separation of 



2 Hamilton, " Pacificus " Letter, June 29, 1793, and Roosevelt, Auto- 

 biography, pp. 388-389, quoted, Corwin, The President's Control of Foreign 

 Relations, pp. 11, 168. See also infra, sec. 92. 



3 Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U. S. 46, 81-83, Corwin, ot>. cit., p. 31. 



* Parsons v. U. S., 167 U. S. 324; Willoughby, op. cit., pp. 1181-1184, 

 and Congressional debate of 1789 on the question there cited. Infra, sec. 

 230. The removal power is not, however, regarded as an inherent executive 

 power in the states. Goodnow, op. cit., p; 311. 



5/h re Debs, 158 U. S. 595; Carter v. Va.. 96 Va. 791; Willoughby, op. 

 cit., pp. 1268-1270; J. P. Hall, Constitutional Law, p. 19. 



6 Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204; Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U. S. 

 168; In re Chapman, 166 U. S. 661; Willoughby, op. cit., p. 1272. 



■'See Taft, Our Chief Magistrate, pp. y:^, 140, 144; Senate debate of 

 1831 quoted Corwin, op. cit., p. 59; and infra, sec. 92. 



