192 WRIGHT— LIMITATIONS UPON NATIONAL POWERS. 



power is a limitation rather than a source of power for each de- 

 partment. We may express the doctrine in three principles.^ 



53. Protection of Independence of Departments. 



Each department is endowed with such rights, privileges and 

 inherent powers as will assure its independence of the others.^ 

 Thus members of Congress are immune from arrest during the 

 session, each house is given exclusive authority to judge the quali- 

 fications of its own members, to make its own rules of procedure, 

 to discipline and expel its own members and to subpoena witness 

 and commit for contempt when necessary for performing its 

 legislative functions.^'' The President is immune from judicial 

 process except trial of impeachment and holds himself entitled to 

 exclusive control of the personnel of the national civil and military 

 service through the power to commission and remove officials. ^^ 

 The Federal Justices are assured permanence of tenure and com- 

 pensation and the courts hold themselves to enjoy certain inherent 

 privileges such as the power to commit for contempt and perhaps 

 to control admissions to the bar and rules of practice. ^^ These 

 rights, privileges and inherent powers cannot be impaired by action 

 of the organ itself or by that of other organs. 



54. Protection of Delegated Powers of Departments. 



Each department is entitled to exercise the powers delegated to 

 it by the Constitution. Two interpretations of this guarantee of 

 quite divergent effect must be distinguished. Thus it is generally 

 recognized that one organ cannot, unless the Constitution expressly 

 provides otherwise, take away a power specifically or impliedly 



^ Infra, sees. 53-55- 



9 Goodnow, op. cit., p. 38. 



10 Constitution, I, sees. S, 6, and supra, note 6. 



11 Mississippi v. Johnson, 4 Wall. 475; Willoughby, op. cit., 1300-1304; 

 Constitution, II, sec. 3, and supra, note 4. 



^2 Constitution, III, sec. i, supra, note 5. Illinois and Pennsylvania hold 

 the setting of standards for admission to the bar is an inherent judicial 

 power (In re Day, 181 III, 73, In re Splane, 123 Pa. 527), while New York 

 and North Carolina hold the contrary (Matter of Cooper, 22 N. Y. 67, Re 

 applicants for license, 143 N. C. i). Indiana holds that statutes cannot 

 lower the standard set by court rules of procedure. (Epstein v. State, 128 

 N. F. 353, Ind. 1920, and note in Minn. Law Rev., 5 : 73, Dec, 1920.) 



