WRIGHT— LIMITATIONS UPON NATIONAL POWERS. 195 



it, we may be sure the government as a whole has the power. 

 Treaties have occasionally required that responsibilities be met 

 through a particular instrumentality, as that certain controversies 

 be submitted to an international tribunal, or that the compromis 

 of arbitrations be made by the President with advice and consent 

 of the Senate.^* Such reference to domestic organs has usually 

 been declaratory of the Constitution, and has been inserted out of 

 excess of caution to give notice to the foreign government of 

 constitutional steps which must be taken, or by insistence of one 

 department of the government to prevent anticipated usurpations 

 by another. If, however, a treaty required that certain acts be 

 performed by a particular organ, which, under the theory of sep- 

 aration of powers, could not exercise such a power, that clause of 

 the treaty could not be executed by the United* States. Such a 

 treaty clause, however, would be unconstitutional from the start. 

 The question would relate, therefore, to the power to make treaties 

 rather than to the power to meet international responsibilities.^^ 



57. Power of the President to Meet International Responsibilities. 



Although the doctrine of separation of powers does not legally 

 limit the power of the government to meet its responsibilities, it 

 often throws practical difificulties in the way of prompt action. 

 Congress is by nature slow moving but often under the constitu- 

 tional distribution of powers it alone has power to meet certain 

 international responsibilities. Were the President and the courts 

 vested with adequate authority to act, delay in the meeting of 

 responsibilities might often be avoided. The President and courts 

 cannot, under the doctrine which prohibits the delegation of legis- 

 lative power be vested with such exclusive congressional powers 

 as that to appropriate money and to declare war. Thus a prompt 

 meeting of responsibilities requiring such acts depends upon con- 

 gressional observance of the constitutional understanding which 



2* See pecuniary claims convention with Latin American States, 1910, 

 Charles, Treaties, 345; arbitration treaty with Great Britain, 1908, Art. V, 

 Malloy, Treaties, p. 814. For other treaty provisions referring to specific 

 organs see Wright, Columbia Latv Rev., 20: 123-4. 



25 Supra, sees. 45, 46. 



PROC. AMER. PHIL. SOC., VOL. LX., N, MARCH 8, I922. 



