WRIGHT— LIMITATIONS UPON NATIONAL POWERS. 209 



procedure,^' which by express exception might be made without 

 consent of the United States, are to admit new members (Art. I) 

 which requires two-thirds of the Assembly but which is clearly not 

 an exercise of legislative power, and to make a report in a dispute 

 likely to lead to a rupture, to which the United States is a party. 

 (Art. XV.)®® This will be discussed presently. 



(2) The other consideration which seems to have been over- 

 looked by critics of the Covenant is that no legislative or binding 

 political power has been conferred upon the Council or Assembly. 

 The powers of these bodies are limited to the giving of " advice " 

 or the making of " proposals," " recommendations " or " reports," 

 which even if unanimous are of binding efifect in only three cases.®* 

 These three cases are: (a) The limits of armament once agreed 

 upon by members " shall not be exceeded without the concurrence 

 of the Council." (Art. VIII, sec. 4.) (b) If a country has vol- 

 untarily accepted a mandate, and has neglected to fully define " the 

 degree of authority, control or administration " which it is to exer- 

 cise, the Council may " explicitly define " these powers in each case. 

 (Art. XXII, sec. 8.) (c) A dispute likely to lead to a rupture 



87 These may be settled by a majority vote (Art. V). Amendments 

 to the Covenant, though requiring ratification by only a majority of the 

 members represented in the Assembly, require ratification by all the members 

 represented in the Council, thus always 'including the United States (Art. 

 26). 



88 See Lowell, The Covenanter, N. Y., 1919, p. 81, and British Official 

 Commentary, printed in Pollock, The League of Nations, London, 1920, p. 

 208. 



8^ Lowell, The Covenanter, pp. 40, 80. Some doubt exists as to whether 

 the '■ advice" which the Council may give as to the method of carrying out 

 the guarantees of Article X is obligatory. Lowell (Ibid., p. 40) and Pollock 

 (op. cit., p. 128) believe not, while the Official Swiss Commentary holds that 

 for members that have assented to the " advice," if unanimous, it is obligatory. 

 (League of Nations, World Peace Foundation, III, No. 3, p. 125.) So far 

 as the "advice " extends merely to an interpretation of the meaning of the 

 treaty, we are inclined to agree with the latter opinion (supra, sec. 35), which 

 appears to be consonant with the interpretation of similar terms in article XVI 

 by the Second Assembly of the League (see Report of International Block- 

 ade Committee, Second Assembly Document No. 28, part II, and resolutions 

 adopted October 4, 1921, Official Journal, Special Supp. No. 6, p. 25). 



