210 WRIGHT— LIMITATIONS UVON NATIONAL POWERS. 



must be submitted to the Council or Assembly and if no solution 

 is reached the Council or Assembly make a report. 



" If a report by the Council is unanimously agreed to by the members 

 thereof, other than the representatives of one or more of the parties to 

 the dispute, the members of the League agree that they will not go to war 

 with any party to the dispute which complies with the recommendations of 

 the report." (Art. XV, sec. 6.) 



If the dispute is submitted to the Assembly it has the same effect 



" if concurred in by the Representatives of those Members of the League rep- 

 lesented on the Council and by a majority of the other Members of the 

 League, exclusive in each case of the Representatives of the parties to the 

 dispute." (Art. XV, sec. lo.) 



Although binding decisions may be given in the first two cases by 

 unanimous action of the Council, the power exercised would not 

 be " legislative " but merely a carrying out of the policy already 

 agreed upon in the treaties providing for disarmament or accept- 

 ance of the mandatory. Decision on such a question clearly may 

 be delegated. ^° In the third case which relates to the settlement 

 of political controversies which the parties have not agreed to 

 submit to arbitration, it will be observed that the decision even if 

 unanimous with exception of the parties to the dispute is not strictly 

 binding. If the United States were a party to the dispute it w^ould 

 not be legally bound to follow the report, even if all other members 

 of the Council or Assembly had signed it. Doubtless, however, 

 there would be a practical compulsion, in view of the fact that it 

 could get no members of the League as allies in case it went to war 

 with the other party to the dispute.^^ 



(3) A third consideration which should be noticed is that the 

 most discussed provisions of the Covenant such as Articles X, XII, 

 and XVI do not delegate power at all. They are guarantees which 

 leave to the members of the League discretion in deciding upon the 

 method for carrying them out in concrete cases.**^ Of course the 

 United States would have to follow constitutional provisions in 



90 Supra, sec. 60. 



91 See British Commentary, Pollock, op. cit., p. 212 ; Swiss Commentary, 

 op. cit., p. 137- 



92 Lowell, The Covenanter, p. 2>7- 



