WRIGHT— CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. 217 



be done in a particular way, and which prohibit the contrary, of which a 

 striking example is to be found in that which declares that no money shall 

 be drawn from the Treasury but in consequence of appropriations to be made 

 by law. This not only imposes an important restriction on the power, 

 but gives to Congress as the law-making power, and to the House of Rep- 

 resentatives as a portion of Congress, the right to withhold appropriations; 

 and thereby, an important control over the treaty-making power, whenever 

 money is required to carry a treaty into effect; which is usually the case, 

 especially in reference to those of much importance. There still remains 

 another, and more important limitation, but of a more general and indefinite 

 character. It can enter into no stipulation calculated to change the char- 

 acter of the government ; or to do that which can only be done by the 

 constitution-making power; or which is inconsistent with the nature and 

 structure of the government." 



This seems to follow the recognized view. It should be noticed, 

 however, that while, under constitutional law (though not under 

 international law), Congress has the right to withhold appropria- 

 tions, yet by constitutional understandings^ it ought not to do so. 

 Thus though .a treaty could not vest the power to make appropria- 

 tions in any organ other than Congress, yet, the fact that a treaty 

 requires an appropriation does not impeach the validity of a treaty, 

 as Calhoun himself clearly stated while Secretary of State:* 



" The treaty-making power has, indeed, been regarded to be so compre- 

 hensive as to embrace, with few exceptions, all questions that' can possibly 

 arise between us and other nations, and which can only be adjusted by 

 their mutual consent, whether the subject matter be comprised among the 

 delegated or the reserved powers. So far, indeed, is it from being true, 

 as the report supposed, that the mere fact of a power being delegated to 

 Congress excludes it from being the subject of treaty stipulations; that even 

 its exclusive delegation, if we may judge from the habitual practice of the 

 government, does not — of which the power of appropriating money affords 

 a striking example. It is expressly and exclusively delegated to Congress, 

 and yet scarcely a treaty has been made of any importance which does not 

 stipulate for the payment of money. No objection has ever been made on 

 this account. The only question ever raised in reference to it is, whether 

 Congress has not unlimited discretion to grant or withhold the appro- 

 priation." 



^ Infra, sec. 256. 



* Mr. Calhoun, Sec. of State, to Mr. Wheaton, jNIinister to Prussia, 

 June 28, 1844. Moore, Digest, 5 : 164. See also infra, sec. 59. 



