220 WRIGHT— CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. 



of making that provision ought to know no other bounds than the exigencies 

 of the nation and the resources of the community." 



69. Important Limitations from Separation of Powers. 



In fact the only important legal limitation upon the foreign 

 relations power seems to be that, resulting from the doctrine of 

 separation of powers, that all acts must be performed by the organ 

 designated for that purpose by the Constitution. With a proper 

 application of the understandings of the Constitution this limita- 

 tion does not interfere with an adequate meeting of international 

 responsibilities and carrying out of national policies except in one 

 case. This is where the achievement of these ends requires that 

 powers be vested in an international body created by treaty. As 

 we have seen there is no difficulty in vesting such a body with au- 

 thority to decide on questions of fact and law since the treaty 

 power, or the treaty power supplemented by congressional legisla- 

 tion have been held fully competent to create agencies for these 

 purposes. ^^ A difficulty might arise, in case such a body were 

 given appellate jurisdiction over the Supreme Court but this could 

 be eliminated either by treaty provision for starting original action 

 in the international tribunal or, in certain cases, by congressional 

 provision for special tribunals within the United States, not exer- 

 cising the judicial power of the United States, for the original 

 hearing, from which appeal might be taken to the international 

 court.^^ 



A delegation of political power, that is legislative or treaty-mak- 

 ing power, to such a body would be luiconstitutional, but this never 

 seems to have been contemplated. Bodies such as the Assembly 

 and Council of the League of Nations, in which all binding political 

 decisions require the assent of the American representative, would 

 not violate this principle, since the American representative would 

 presumably be instructed to withhold his consent or give merely 

 tentative consent in any matter within the exclusive competence 

 of Congress or the treaty-making power until those organs had 

 acted. ^'^ 



15 Supra, sec. 60, note 42 ; infra, sees. 225-227. 



16 Stipra, sec. 64. 

 1'^ Supra, sec. 63. 



