234 WRIGHT— POSITION OF FOREIGN RELATIONS 



sociated from the ordinary executive powers exercised independ- 

 ently by the President but within the Hmits of detailed statutes. 

 83. A Fourth Department. Opinion of Theoretical Writers. 



A careful examination of the views of Locke and Montesquieu 

 will indicate that they regarded the control of foreign relations as 

 a distinct department of government. Locke used the term " fed- 

 erative " to designate this department and distinguished it from 

 both the " executive " and " legislative " departments.^^ 



" But because the laws, that are at once, and in a short time made, have 

 a constant and lasting force, and need a perpetual execution or an attendance 

 thereunto; therefore, it is necessary there should be a power always in being 

 which should see to the execution of the laws that are made, and remain in 

 force. And thus the legislative and executive power come often to be 

 separated. 



" There is another power in every commonwealth. . . . Though in a 

 commonwealth the members of it are distinct persons still in reference to one 

 another, and as such are governed by the laws of the society; yet in reference 

 to the rest of mankind, they make one body. . . . Hence it is that the con- 

 troversies that happen between any man of the society with those that are 

 out of it are managed by the public, and an injury done to a member of their 

 body engages the whole in the reparation of it. This, therefore, contains the 

 power of war and peace, leagues and alliancfes, and all the transactions, "with 

 all persons and communities without the commonwealth; and may be called 

 federative, if anyone pleases. So the thing be understood, I am indifferent 

 as to the name. 



" These two powers, executive and federative, though they be really dis- 

 tinct in themselves, yet one comprehending the execution of the municipal 

 laws of the society within itself, upon all that are parts of it; the other the 

 management of the security and interest of the public without, with all those 

 that it may receive benefit or damage from; yet they are always almost 

 united. And though this federative power in the well- or ill-management of 

 it be of great moment to the commonwealth, yet it is much less capable to be 

 directed by antecedent standing, positive laws, than the executive; and so 

 must necessarily be left to the prudence and wisdom of those whose hands it 

 is in, to be managed for the public good: for the laws that concern subjects 

 one amongst another, being to» direct their actions, may well enough precede 

 them. But what is to be done in reference to foreigners, depending much 

 upon their actions, and the variation of designs, and interests, must be left in 

 great part to the prudence of those who have this power committed to them 

 to be managed by the best of their skill, for the advantage of the common- 

 wealth. 



" Though, as I said, the executive and federative power of every com- 

 munity be really distinct in themselves, yet they are hardly to be separated 



23 Treatise of Civil Government, sees. 144-148, Works, ed. 1801, 5 : 425-6. 



