256 WRIGHT— POWER TO MEET RESPONSIBILITIES. 



duty and the public honor." ^® President Arthur vetoed the second 

 Chinese exclusion bill for similar reasons. ^^ The President may 

 also use his powers of persuasion upon Congress to cause the re- 

 peal of an act in disregard of international law or treaty as did 

 President Wilson with success in the Panama Canal tolls contro- 

 versy.^° 



The courts are bound by acts of Congress, but said Chief Jus- 

 tice Marshall, " an act of Congress ought never to be construed to 

 violate the law of nations if any other possible construction re- 

 mains." ^^ With this principle Marshall construed the broad juris- 

 diction over offenses at sea conferred by various acts of Congress 

 as confined to American vessels or vessels within American juris- 

 diction as defined by international law.^^ It seems that the court 

 neglected an opportunity to apply this principle in the Behring Sea 

 cases of 1887, a neglect which may have been partly responsible for 

 the expensive and futile arbitration later entered into.^^ In the case 

 of American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., however, the supreme 

 court applied the principle by interpreting the Sherman Anti-Trust 

 Act, though general in terms, as applying only within the jurisdic- 

 tion of the United States as defined by international law.^* 



102. Observance of International Law by the Treaty-Making Power. 

 The President and Senate ought not to make treaties in disre- 

 gard of the rights of third state under international law or earlier 

 treaties and have not often done so. Frequently treaties have ex- 

 pressly excepted the rights of third states under existing treaties or 



18 Richardson, op. cit., 7: 519-520. 



19 Message, April 4, 1882, ibid., 8: 112. 



20 Supra, note 6. 



21 Murray v. The Charming Betsey, 2 Cranch 64, 118, 1804. 



22 U. S. V. Palmer, 3 Wheat. 610, 1818; U. S. v. Pirates, U. S. v. 

 Klintock, U. S. V. Holmes, 5 Wheat. 144, 152, 184 200, 412, 1820. 



2^ Infra, sec. 107. 



24 " All legislation is prima facie territorial, words having universal 

 scope, such as every contract in restraint of trade, . . . will be taken as a 

 matter of course to mean only every one subject to such legislation, not all 

 that' the legislator may subsequently be able to catch." American Banana 

 Co. V. United Fruit Co., 219 U. S. 347, 1909. See also Sandberg v. 

 McDonald, 248 U. S. 185, Am. Jl. Int. Law, 13: 339. 



