302 WRIGHT— POWER TO MEET RESPONSIBILITIES. 



sponsibility or at least definite authorization of a violation is al- 

 leged. ^^ It is, therefore, only responsibilities of the third type, now 

 under consideration, which can raise a question for international 

 discussion, and such a question may be raised by a claim for (i) 

 specific performance or (2) reparation. These are the two types of 

 obligations imposed by international law.^* They imply " a tie ; 

 whereby one (state) is bound to perform some act for the benefit 

 of another " ^^ and are thus to be distinguished from responsibilities, 

 almost synonymous with liabilities, which imply a situation in which 

 one state may suffer if it acts, permits action, or fails to act so as 

 to injure others.'*' 



33 Friendly controversies merely to ascertain rights resulting in decisions 

 of the nature of declaratory judgments would be an exception. Boundary 

 controversies are sometimes of this character, though usually they are occa- 

 sioned by incidents alleged to constitute an encroachment. 



^■t These two obligations bear a certain resemblance to the two obligations 

 known in Roman law as obligationes ex contractu and ex delicto and in com- 

 mon law as contracts and torts. There is, however, a difference. The dis- 

 tinction between contracts and torts depends upon whether or not the obliga- 

 tion is founded on special agreement or on general law; whereas the distinc- 

 tion we here make depends upon whether or not the obligation can be carried 

 out or merely compensated for. In fact, however, practically the only inter- 

 national obligations which can furnish grounds for a demand for specific 

 carrying out are founded on special agreements. But on the other hand, 

 obhgations which may furnish grounds for a claim for compensation may be 

 founded upon either general law or special agreement. See Salmond, Juris- 

 prudence, pp. 558-559- 



35 Holland, Jurisprudence, p. 241. 



36 " Liability or responsibility is the bond of necessity that exists between 

 the wrongdoer and the remedy of the wrong." (Salmond, Jurisprudence, sec. 

 126.) In the terminology which has developed from discussion of Professor 

 Hohf eld's article on Fundamental Legal Conceptions {Yale L. J., 23: 16), we 

 say that B is under an obligation (or duty) when the services of organized 

 society can be enlisted against him by A and correlatively that A has a right. 

 On the other hand, B is under a liability (or responsibility) when organized 

 society permits A to act against him and correlatively A has a power. (See 

 addresses at meeting of Association of American Law Schools in Chicago, 

 Dec. 29, 1920, especially that by Kocourek, Am. Law School Rev., 4: 615.) 



Rights and obligations imply a society organized to the extent of provid- 

 ing agencies for authoritatively judging justiciable controversies between its 

 members. There are no true rights or obligations where each man is judge 

 of the merits of his own case. (Supra, sec. 139.) Powers and liabilities, 

 however, may exist in a society organized only to the extent of refusing to 

 permit self help in certain cases. There are no true powers or liabilities 



