WRIGHT— POWER TO MAKE AGREEMENTS. 323 



(2) What sort of an obligation do they impose? No general answer 

 can be given to the latter question. An executive agreement may 

 impose an absolute obligation as would be true of the executive 

 iettlement of a claim oy an American citizen against a foreign gov- 

 ernment. After the President has agreed to a settlement, the 

 claim becomes res adjudicata and if against the American citizen, 

 cannot be raised by a subsequent administration against the foreign 

 government. If injustice has been done the American citizen, it 

 is a moral duty of the United States itself to compensate him.^^ 

 On the other hand, an executive agreement may impose an obliga- 

 tion strictly binding only the President, who makes it, as would 

 be true of an exchange of notes over foreign policy, such as the 

 Root-Takahira agreement, or the Lansing-Ishii agreement. 



In general, the President can bind only himself and his succes- 

 sors in office by executive agreements, but in certain cases, executive 

 agreements may impose a strong moral obligation upon the treaty- 

 making power and Congress, and they may even be cognizable in 

 the courts. The form of the obligation does not afifect its obligatory 

 character. Executive agreements may be by exchange of notes, 

 protocols, cartels, modi vivendl, etc., but in any case the obligation 

 depends upon the subject matter.^" 



162. Administrative Agreements under Authority of Act of 

 Congress. 

 To discover the subjects on which the President may make 

 international agreements, we must examine his constitutional powers. 

 For this purpose we may distinguish his powers as (i) head of the 

 administration, (2) as commander-in-chief, (3) as the represen- 

 tative organ in international relations. The President is Chief 

 Executive and head of the Federal administration with power to 

 direct and remove officials and the duty to " take care that the 

 laws be faithfully executed." But the exercise of these powers, 

 and the meeting of this responsibility is dependent upon the laws 

 which Congress may pass, organizing the administration and defin- 



i» Meade v. U. S., 9 Wall. 691; Borchard, op. cit., p. 379; Comegys z: 

 Vasse, I Pet. 193, 212. 



20 See also infra, sec. 166. • 



PROC. AMER. PHIL. SOC, VOL. LX., V, M.\RCH 13, I922. 



