RELATIONS OF INDEPENDENT DEPARTMENTS. 437 



congressional cooperation for their execution. Of this character 

 are treaty provisions deaHngs with finances, whether (i) requiring 

 appropriations of money, or (2) altering revenue laws and com- 

 mercial regulations. While even in these cases Congress ought to 

 act so as to give effect to a ratifed treaty, yet the treaty-making 

 power is under an equal obligation to consider, in connection with 

 its view of international policy, the views on domestic policy of 

 Congress, before finally ratifying the instrument. In these matters 

 foreign and domestic policy are connected with extraordinary in- 

 timacy, and a complete collaboration of the treaty power and the 

 legislative power is appropriate. An opportunity for Congress to 

 pass upon treaties of this character before ratification would seem 

 generally expedient though not legally necessary.*^ 



Other treaty provisions require for their performance detailed 

 supplementary' legislation or specific acts which the Constitution 

 directs to be performed by Congress. In this category are treaty 

 provisions requiring (3) the incorporation and administration of 

 territory/* (4) the organization of courts and creation of offices 

 and (5) a declaration of war in certain contingencies, or abstention 

 from war.*^ In these cases Congress is bound to act and carry out 

 in good faith the obligations which the treaty power has undertaken. 



*3 The objection brought in the Federal Convention of 1787 against such 

 submission to Congress, that it would make secrecy impossible (Farrand, 

 op. cit., 2: 538), would probably have less weight at present. See also supra, 

 sees. 59, 149, 154. Sir Cecil Hurst reported to the 6th committee of the First 

 Assembly of the League of Nations that " at the time when the convention of 

 Saint Germain (for control of arms trade) was drawn up it was realized 

 that in certain countries the complete execution of its provisions might 

 necessitate legislation " (First Assembly Document, No. 199) and the Tem- 

 porary Mixed Commission on Armaments attributed the failure of the United 

 States to ratify this convention to the failure of Congress to pass the neces- 

 sary legislation (Second Assembly Document, No. 81, p. 15). Congres.s 

 failed to respond to the President's request for legislation in execution of 

 similar provisions of the Brussels act of 1890. (Moore, Digest, 2: 468-474.) 

 Supra, sec. 118. 



** The terminology of Art. 4, sec. 3. cl. 2, indicates that the power is 

 supplementary in character. 



*' That the power of Congress to declare war is directory, rather than a 

 peculiar congressional prerogative, is indicated by the incorporation in the 

 same clause of the power to " make rules concerning captures," which is 

 clearly shared with the treaty power. Supra, sec. 151. 



