INSTRUMENTALITIES FOR FOREIGN RELATIONS. 439 



unless the treaty power has given due consideration to the attitude 

 of Congress before making the commitment. 



" There is force, no doubt," says David Jayne Hill, " in the contention 

 that the Congress of the United States is under a moral obligation to main- 

 tain the honor of the nation, which implies the strict fulfillment of all pledges 

 made by the treaty-making power, but there is even more weight in the 

 affirmation that the treaty-making power is under a moral obligation not to 

 pledge the honor of the nation in doubtful conditions, as well as under a 

 legal obligation not to destroy the freedom of a coordinate branch of the 

 government by pledging it to a performance beyond the intentions of the 

 Constitution from which all its authority is derived." *s 



C. Duty of the Departments to Act. 



257. Constitutional Understanding Respecting the Establishment of 

 Necessary Instrumentalities. 



The difficulty which arises from the lack of constitutional instru- 

 mentalities for meeting all international responsibilities is met in 

 part by the legal duty of the President " to take care that the laws 

 be faithfully executed " and in part by an understanding requiring 

 Congress to supply the instrumentalities necessary for meeting inter- 

 national responsibilities. Story pointed out that Congress was under 

 an obligation to establish inferior federal courts in order to carry 

 out the purposes of the Constitution.^^ 



^8 Hill, Present Problems in Foreign Policy, 1919. p. 171. Secretary of 

 State Hughes has spoken to the same effect : " The extent to which Congress 

 would regard itself as bound, as a matter of good faith, to enact legislation 

 for the purpose of carrying out treaties has been the subject of debate, from 

 time to time, since the days of Washington. Despite these debates, and not- 

 withstanding its power to frustrate the carrying out of treaties. Congress in 

 a host of instances has passed the necessary legislation to give them effect; 

 and the disposition has frequently been manifested to avoid any basis for the 

 charge of bad faith through a disregard of treaty stipulations. . . . Foreign 

 nations might be expected to take the view that they were not concerned with 

 our internal arrangements, and that it was the obligation of the United States 

 to see that the action claimed to have been agreed upon was taken. If that 

 action was not taken, although Congress refused to act because it believed it 

 was entitled to refuse, we should still be regarded as guilty of a breach of 

 faith. It is a very serious matter for the treaty-making power to enter into 

 an engagement calling for action by Congress unless there is every reason to 

 believe that Congress will' act accordingly." (Address in New York, March 

 26, 1919, on the League of Nations Covenant, International Conciliation, 

 Special Bulletin, April, 1919, pp. 689-691.) See also supra, sec. 39. 



49 Martin v. Hunter, i Wheat. 304 (1816). 



