WRIGHT— CONTROL OF FOREIGN RELATIONS. 445 



tutional fathers. It was emphasized by many speakers in the federal 



convention/^ by the authors of the FederaHst/* and by President 



Washington in his message on the Jay treaty .^^ The same opinion 



was restated by De Tocqueville, who, because he doubted the abihty 



of democracy to achieve this concentration, doubted its capacity to 



cope with foreign affairs. 



need of expedition is better administered by one than by many; whereas, 

 whatever depends on the legislative power is oftentimes better regulated by 

 many than by a single person. But if there was no monarch, and the 

 executive power was committed to a certain number of persons selected from 

 the legislative body, there would be an end of liberty ; by reason the two pow- 

 ers would be united, as the same persons would actually sometimes have, 

 and would moreover always be able to have, a share in both." (Montesquieu, 

 L'Esprit des lois, 1. xi, c. 6, ed. Philadelphia, 1802, i : 181, 186.) 



12 " With regard to foreign concerns, the king is the delegate or repre- 

 sentative of his people. It is impossible that the individuals of a state, 

 in their collective capacity, can transact the affairs of that state with an- 

 other community equally numerous as themselves. Unanimity must be want- 

 ing to their measures, and strength to the execution of their counsels. In 

 the king, therefore, as in a centre, all the rays of his people are united, 

 and form by that imion a consistency, splendor, and power that make 

 him feared and respected by foreign potentates ; who would scruple to enter 

 into any engagement that must afterwards be revised and ratified by a popu- 

 lar assembly. What is done by the royal authority, with regard to foreign 

 powers, is the act of the whole nation; what is done without the king's con- 

 currence is the act only of private men." (Blackstone, Commentaries, i: 

 252.) 



13 See remarks by Hamilton and Gouverneur Morris, Farrand, op. cit., 

 I : 290, 513. 



1* " It seldom happens in the negotiation of treaties, of whatever nature, 

 but that perfect secrecy and immediate dispatch are sometimes requisite. 

 There are cases where the most useful intelligence may be obtained, if the 

 persons possessing it can be relieved from apprehension of discovery. Those 

 apprehensions will operate on those persons whether they are actuated by 

 mercenary or friendly motives ; and there doubtless are many of both de- 

 scriptions who would rely on the secrecy of the President, but' who would 

 not confide in that of the Senate, and still less in that of a large popular 

 assembly. The convention have done well, therefore, in so disposing of the 

 power of making treaties that although the President must, in forming 

 them, act by the advice and consent of the Senate, yet he will be able to 

 manage the business of intelligence in such a manner as prudence may 

 suggest. 



" They who have turned their attention to the affairs of men must have 

 perceived that there are tides in them ; tides very irregular in their duration, 

 strength and direction and seldom found to run twice exactly in the same 



