WRIGHT— CONTROL OF FOREIGN RELATIONS. 449 



into the administration of distant dependencies, which has been that war's 

 most striking and momentous consequence. When foreign affairs play a 

 prominent part in the poHtics and policy of a nation, its Executive must of 

 necessity be its guide; must utter every initial judgment, take every first step 

 of action, supply the information upon which it is to act, suggest and in 

 large measure control its conduct. 



" It may be, too, that the new leadership of the Executive, inasmuch as it 

 is likely to last, will have a very far-reaching effect upon our whole method 

 of government. It may give the heads of the executive departments a new 

 influence upon the action of Congress. It may bring about, as a conse- 

 quence, an integration which will substitute statesmanship for government 

 by mass meeting. It may put this whole volume hopelessly out of date." 



Where the President has acted in domestic administration, he 

 has acted within limits, narrowly defined by Congress, and as time 

 has gone on, his discretion in this field has become less and less. 

 Where, on the contrary, he has acted in foreign affairs, his discre- 

 tion has been very wide, and Congress has generally followed his 

 lead. " The Senate," says Carl Russell Fish, speaking of the period 

 since 1898, "has been confined to checking or modifying the policy 

 of the administration. The direction of policy has been with the 

 executive." ^^ Can we not assume that the result of over a century 

 of experience under the Constitution illustrates certain necessities 

 in an adequate control of foreign affairs ? ^^ 



265. Constitutional Change Not Necessary. 



Our system for controlling foreign relations has been copied 

 in its main outlines on the continent of Europe, and its adoption 

 has been suggested as a reform worth considering in England. It 

 has in it elements making for concentration of authority in an 

 emergency, yet it assures control by the people's representatives of 

 permanent obligations. More than all we are used to it. Remem- 

 bering Montaigne's warning that " all great mutations shake and 

 disorder a state," ^^ we may question the advisability of radical 

 change in the Constitution. 



266. Need of Constitutional Understandings. 



Improvement lies not in structural change in our organs for con- 



23 American Diplomacy, N. Y., 1916, p. 428; see also Reinsch, World 

 Politics, p. 337. 



2* Corwin, op. cit., p. 207. 



25 Montaigne, Essays, Cotton, ed., 2 : 760. 



