450 WRIGHT— CONTROL OF FOREIGN RELATIONS. 



trol of foreign relations,-*' but in the development of understandings 

 for the smooth interaction of the independent departments of govern- 

 ment. Lord John Russell remarked that " political constitutions in 

 which different bodies share the supreme power are only enabled to 

 exist by the forbearance of those among whom this power is dis- 

 tributed." -' It is a familiar thought and has been developed in 

 detail by Professor Dicey, who distinguishes the conventions or 

 understanding from the law of the British Constitution. The former 

 explain how the independent organs of the supreme power, King, 

 Lords and Commons, shall exercise their discretion, i.e.^ how the 

 Crown shall exercise its prerogative and the Houses of Parliament 

 their privileges. He believes that in England these conventions have 

 grown up so as to assure the ultimate triumph of the will of the 

 political sovereign, i.e., the majority of the voters for members of 

 the House of Commons.^* 



In the eighteenth century the British Constitution, though per- 

 haps organized to preserve liberty, as Montesquieu, De Lolme and 

 Blackstone thought, was a jarring and jangling instrument. There 

 was little of smoothness in the relations of George HI, his ministers 

 and his parliaments. The United States Constitution is now in 

 that condition. We have good institutions but we have not yet de- 



26 The writer is inclined to believe that a change in the treaty power from 

 two-thirds of the Senate to a majority of both houses would be an improve- 

 ment. This would be in accord with the practice of most continental Euro- 

 pean governments. It would obviate the complaint of the House of Repre- 

 sentatives and eliminate the ever present possibility of inability to execute a 

 treaty, valid at international law, because of refusal of the House to agree to 

 appropriations or necessary legislation. It would also make deadlocks less 

 frequent. One party is much more likely to control a majority of both 

 houses than two-thirds of the Senate. The main objection of the fathers to 

 submission to the House was on the score of secrecy, and this has frequently 

 been abandoned by the Senate in recent years. This change, which would, of 

 course, require a constitutional amendment, would make the treaty-making 

 power the same as the legislative power, except that the President would have 

 the sole initiative, and retaining an ultimate decision on ratification, would 

 have an absolute veto. See also J. T. Young, The New American Movement, 

 N. Y., 191S, p. 25, and former Representative and Governor of Massachusetts, 

 S. W. McCall, "Of the Senate" and "Again the Senate," Atlantic Monthly. 

 Oct., 1903, and Sept., 1920. 



27 Quoted, Wilson, Cong. Govt., 15th ed., p. 242. 



28 Dicey, The Law of the Constitution, 8th ed., Chap. XIV. 



