Tin-: I'lIILOSOIMl J(, AL LIMITS OK SCIENCE. ;i,2J 



The hrst limit of science on the pliilosophical >i(le is to be 

 found in metaphysics. This tests all the underlying- assumi)tions 

 of science. No science can, by its own methods, assure us of 

 the value of its own postulates. Even the axioms of Whitehead 

 and Russell's Principia are amenalile to further analysis by the, 

 metaphysician. 



This analysis ha.s sometimes been extravagant, as was the 

 case with Le Roy, the mathematician, physicist and meta])hysi- 

 cian. lie contended that the foundations of science were too 

 shaky to admit of assured knowledge. .Ml that we could arrive 

 at is a number of useful rules for the guidance of life. (liven 

 human life on this i)lanet the so-called laws of nature were 

 useful conventions to be noted. For the intellect distorts all 

 that it touches. In his system imr x comc^ periliously near to 

 zero. 



Yet the sense-data, the particles, |K)ints and instants, which 

 are taken for granted by the mathematician and the physicist, 

 need to be ex])lained in some coherent way. if science is not to 

 be built \xy>on sand. The. ideas which they suggest are full of 

 apparent contradictions and intellectual (lit¥iculties, whicli are 

 outside the purview of pure science. 



Then take the belief that buoys up many scientists, and is 

 a fundamental ])rinci])le with them in {)ractice : that the laws 

 of nature are fixed and so discoverable. The idea occurs sponta- 

 neously to most investigators, who deal habitually with natural 

 phenomena. They become im]>resse(l with their recurrence ac- 

 cording to law. But if this idea is anything more than an in- 

 stinct, there must be some explanation of the wild jiaradoxes 

 which it seems to entail. 



My |X)int is that whatever view we take of these funda- 

 mental facts and ]>rinciples, and of others like tliem, becomes 

 a system (more or less ample) of metaph\sics. which nuist in- 

 fluence and to some extent limit our knowledge. \\\ this wa}' 

 science becomes something more interesting and informative 

 than a game o^f chess. 



Logic is another branch of philosoj)hy whose restraining 

 influence is, or ought to be felt in every department of science. 

 If it did nothing else but clear the ground of a great deal of 

 rubbish, its effect would be beneficial. Its claims are in no 

 danger of being denied to-day ; for there is a school of thinkers 

 who would reduce all philosophy to logic. 



At any rat,e. it analyses and valuates the intellectual tools 

 of science, the mental processes by which science is conducted. 

 In so doing it shows the limitations of these tools. 



Induction, for example, is often called the " new organ " of 

 scientific results. But how can its scoi>e and validity be justi- 

 fied? What are the conditions of its valid exercise? On these 

 points there has been a bewildering discussion among the logi- 

 cians. It may be said that logic itself is discredited when it 

 gives a hesitating verdict al)out the value of ])rocesses that the 

 average man uses without hesitation. Tyi)es of logical theorv 



