MOORE— OUTLINE. 293 



There is as little reason for the assertion in the one case as in the 

 other. 



III. The Future. — Since the great conflict in Europe began, 

 the days have perhaps been rare on which the teacher or student of 

 international law has not been greeted with the profound remark 

 that there is no such thing as international law, or that international 

 law has come to an end. As there are comparatively few persons 

 who have deeply studied international law, it should not seem to 

 be ungracious to say that such remarks betray a want of informa- 

 tion, or at any rate of reflection. The rules of international law 

 are by no means so indefinite or uncertain as they are often sup- 

 posed to be, or as interested persons often seek to make them appear 

 to be ; nor is their observance by any means so casual as is sometimes 

 imagined. It would be difficult to find in international law an 

 example of uncertainty greater than that which attended the in- 

 terpretation and enforcement of the so-called Sherman Anti-Trust 

 Law, which, after twenty years of strenuous controversy, was left 

 to be interpreted according to the " rule of reason." Nor is inter- 

 national law in ordinary times badly observed. It is, in fact, usually 

 well enforced ; and any differences in regard to its interpretation 

 and enforcement are, except in matters of a political nature, com- 

 monly left to international tribunals for determination, in connection 

 with individual claims. 



The present misconception in regard to international law is 

 largely due to the tacit but unfounded assumption that municipal 

 law is well enforced in time of war. Precisely the contrary is the 

 fact. There is indeed an ancient maxim of the common law, to the 

 effect that in the midst of arms the laws are silent — Inter arma silent 

 leges. This maxim was not a creation of the fancy, but was merely 

 an expression of the results of experience. Law never has been 

 and never will be found in a flourishing condition between firing 

 lines. War itself means that the reign of law has been superseded 

 by a contention by force. During war the ordinary law is con- 

 stantly superseded by martial law, which has been defined as the 

 " will of the commander-in-chief " ; and while this does not mean an 

 unregulated will, or mere caprice, it does signify the supplanting of 

 the system by which rights are ordinarily regulated and enforced. 



