BROWN— INTERNATIONAL ADMINISTRATION. 313 



inevitable, may be demonstrably insoluble. The science of jurisprudence, 

 when prosecuted in the direction of the law of nations, may end in a reductio 

 ad absurdum." 



Nevertheless, Lorimer has the courage to believe in an international 

 administration of law comparable to the enforcement of municipal 

 law. 



Immanuel Kant, presenting another " impossible scheme " in his 

 memorable essay on " Perpetual Peace," also asserts that : 



" Nations must renounce, as individuals have renounced, the anarchical 

 freedom of savages, and submit themselves to coercive laws; thus forming a 

 community of nations (civitas gentium) which may ultimately extend so as 

 to include all the peoples of the earth." 



Kant is careful, however, to define his community of nations as 

 meaning " a federation of peoples, but not necessarily an inter- 

 national state." He furthermore concedes that : 



" This juristic state must arise from some sort of compact. This com- 

 pact however must not be based on compulsory laws like that lying at the 

 basis of a state; it must rather be that of a permanent free association, like 

 the above mentioned federation of dififerent states." 



It would seem that Kant, in his instiiictive aversion to a universal 

 state possessing coercive powers, revealed a better understanding of 

 the facts of international existence than Lorimer. The trouble with 

 many such attempts to deal with international problems would seem 

 clearly to be that confusion of thought must always arise whenever 

 we try to reason by analogy between nations and individuals. This 

 is evident in considering questions of honor, morality, and par- 

 ticularly so in treating of the international functions of the state. 



In considering the problem of international administration, we 

 ought clearly to recognize at the outset that nations do not meet 

 together and intermingle in a community as do individuals. They 

 do not merge their interests as savages renouncing anarchical free- 

 dom. They do not agree on common conceptions either of legal or 

 moral rights and obligations ; choose their own magistrates ; accept 

 the rule of the majority; and for mutual advantage submit to the 

 benign rule of a common sovereign. 



Individuals have every reason to come intimately together in the 

 daily pursuit of a vital community of interests. Through their 



