314 SYMPOSIUM ON INTERNATIONAL LAW. 



political organization they may secure ready and effective checks on 

 the abuse of power by legislature, judges, and executive. As live, 

 integral parts of a municipal organization, they can regulate, alter, 

 abolish, and create anew the national state within which they have 

 chosen to merge their interests. 



It is obvious that hardly any of this reasoning applies to inter- 

 national relations. The most that nations, jealous of their integrity, 

 and conscious of their exalted missions, ask of each other is freedom 

 to achieve their own worthy ends. That freedom is to be found 

 in separate existence, not in community existence : in a mutual 

 rcognition of each other's interests, not in submission to a common 

 sovereign. They cannot possibly accept the idea of a supranaitional 

 law imposing, as does municipal law, trying restrictions, complicated 

 obligations, or punitive ordinances. The truth of this has been 

 exceedingly well expressed by Reinsch, in urging the necessity of 

 cooperative action between nations, Avhen he says : 



" Any attempt to urge states into action without showing a specific need, 

 on the mere plea of the interest of internationalism, would be, in so far, to 

 jeopardize the normal development and ultimate success of the great move- 

 ment which is one of the most notable phenomena of the era in which we are 

 living. Nor should we expect states readily to give up that power of self- 

 determination, of freely selecting their means, methods, and activities, which 

 constitutes the essence of political sovereignty; however essential, in their 

 own interest, a participation in common action may be, they still remain the 

 principal guardians of human rights and interests, and ought therefore to 

 retain to themselves the necessary freedom of action which such a trust 

 requires." 



The desire to convert international law into supranational law 

 arises probably from the Austinian concept of the need of a superior 

 sanction to law, a concept which has obscured the profound fact 

 that the law of nations is of a distinctly different character from 

 municipal law. 



It may be truly affirmed that the lex gentium is of a more ele- 

 vated nature. Applying as it does inter gentes, it does not appeal 

 to the policeman ; it appeals to reason itself, to the sense of equity, 

 to a higher moral consciousness. It is based solidly on the Golden 

 Rule interpreted in an imperative, utilitarian, and ethical sense, as 

 enlightened self-interest. It is simply the recognition of mutual 



