316 SYMPOSIUM ON INTERNATIONAL LAW. 



sary and even abhorrent. It would have a thankless task, and 

 prove a constant cause of friction, a means of .unjust coercion, a 

 menace to national sensibilities and convictions. 



The question naturally arises : how then is international law to 

 be efficiently administered ? The answer, however, seems obvious ; 

 it is to be administered by national agencies. The courts of most 

 nations are generally sympathetic to the law of nations. It is of 

 pointed interest to note that even now, in the midst of this fearful 

 war, the Supreme Court of the German Empire should have seen 

 fit to protect the patent rights of a French national actually fighting 

 in the trenches in the defence of France ! 



When a court applies international law as a part of municipal 

 law there can hardly be any doubt as to the intrinsic value of that 

 law. The difficulty is not in the nature of the law of nations, or in 

 its enforcement. It lies in the failure of nations to formulate that 

 law with precision, or to provide an adequate body of law covering 

 the wide range of subjects which so often give rise to international 

 litigation. 



This is particularly evident in that branch of international law — 

 which is truly an integral part — well characterized as Conflict of 

 Laws. The grounds for these conflicts should be removed. The 

 rights of aliens in their sojournings and wanderings as citizens of 

 the world should be defined by mutual agreement. The rights of 

 foreign creditors should be clearly determined. So likewise in 

 regard to what may be termed international torts, where aliens are 

 wronged by acts of the state. 



This great task remains in large measure to be performed through 

 diplomatic agreements, conferences, and, if you will, through inter- 

 national legislation. The problem of the administration of this law 

 may safely be left to national courts under the safeguard, in some 

 instances, of an appeal to an international court. 



There is no sound reason for believing that nations actually 

 prefer recourse to war, or even to reprisals, in order to settle differ- 

 ences of a clearly justiciable nature. The present war has demon- 

 strated all too eloquently the horrors, the awful cost, and the folly 

 of litigation by force of arms. If the just political aspirations and 

 national rights of states are satisfactorily gratified and determined. 



