326 SYMPOSIUM ON INTERNATIONAL LAW. 



The Exclusion of Imperialism. 



By such a procedure there might be established that relation 

 between law and its enforcement that is necessary for the solution 

 of this problem ; and it is not to be doubted that it is in this direction 

 that we may seek for a solution. 



It must not be overlooked, however, that, if we are to promote 

 world organization through constitutionalism, we cannot begin auspi- 

 ciously by abandoning its principles ; and, by means of a forcible im- 

 position of what we happen to consider to be law and justice, really 

 substitute for the anarchy we deplore the imperialism we should 

 thereby embrace. 



An empire founded upon a declaration of the rights of man 

 would, indeed, be preferable to a condition of anarchy and violence; 

 but we have no assurance that such an empire can long exist. What 

 we know historically of imperial governments does not encourage 

 such an expectation. They either develop into despotisms, as the 

 Roman Empire did, or radically change their character and become 

 democracies. We have an example of the latter process in the trans- 

 formation now taking place in the British Empire. For the first 

 time the British colonies are persistently referred to as " autono- 

 mous " ; and this word has been used in this sense by a conservative 

 member of the government, ]\Ir. Bonar Law, speaking for the 

 cabinet upon an official occasion ; when he made the interesting state- 

 ment, that what had been impossible before the war will be easy 

 after it, and that the relation of the colonies to the mother-country 

 would never again be what it was before. In fact, it is a confed- 

 eration of autonomous states, rather than an empire in the proper 

 sense, that is coming into existence in what has been known as the 

 British Empire. 



It is in this modification of the conception of sovereignty — which 

 must yet endure even greater modifications — that we find a ground 

 of hope for a permanent and pacific organization of mankind. Un- 

 less we start out with the postulate, that the State is founded upon 

 the inherent rights of its citizens ; and, therefore, reaches its limits 

 of authority where their collective rights of safety and possession 

 end, we shall have no constructive principle upon which to base a 



