76 ' WALTER S. HUNTER 



long" and "precipitate" that lead me to regard perceptual 

 recognition of the boxes as an inadequate explanation of the 

 facts. 



The objections just stated do not apply to the assumption 

 that the representative process is an intra-organic sensation. 

 A positive justification of an ideational function whose content 

 is an internal sensation may now be elaborated. There is no 

 doubt but that in human consciousness a sensation may carry 

 a meaning that is woven into thought sequences. In reading, 

 e.g., all of the actually discernible conscious content may be 

 kinaesthetic sensations from the muscles of the throat or may 

 be auditory sensations, if .the reading be aloud. Whether one 

 say that the sensation is the meaning or that sensation is there 

 plus a meaning, the case for our purpose is unaltered. Each 

 sensation and its meaning become incorporated in a train of 

 thought. A slightly different situation is presented where it 

 ^becomes necessary for the sensation to represent that which is 

 not there and then stimulating the sense organs. The following 

 illustration from Titchener is a case in point : "I had to carry 

 across the room, from bookshelf to typewriter, four references — 

 three volume numbers of a magazine, three dates, and four page 

 numbers. The volumes and years I said aloud, and then con- 

 signed to the care of the preservative tendencies. Of the four 

 page numbers, I held two by A^sual images, one by auditory, 

 and one by kinaesthesis."" The case of the volumes and 3^ears 

 and that of the page numbers remembered by means of kinaes- 

 thesis are significant. Each is an instance (so far as we can 

 tell from the account) of memory without the revival of images. 

 The sensory cues, present at the time when the data were written 

 on the machine, elicited the proper material. It is a dangerous 

 procedure to complete another investigator's introspections. I 

 do not intend to do so here. I simply suggest the above as 

 a possible supplement to Titchener 's own brief statements. 

 Whether it be right or wrong in his case, the experience in 

 which a single sensory process represents an absent object is 

 sufficiently frequent to give us the suggestion for which we 

 are seeking. The suggestion may also be found elsewhere. 

 That which has become known as "conscious attitude" in the 



^' Titchener, E. B. Experimental Psychology of the Thought Processes. New- 

 York, 1909, p. 202. 



